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ANGOLA

MPLA Air Force Said To Use 'Toxic Bombs'

*MB1010063490 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance
of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and
Central Africa 0500 GMT 10 Oct 90*

[Text] The unpopular and corrupt MPLA-PT [Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party]

regime has stepped up its air raids against defenseless civilians in Moxico Province, using toxic and phosphorous bombs. Our Moxico correspondent reports that MiG-23's and Antonov aircraft have indiscriminately bombed villages in Muangai and Leua regions, killing eight civilians and wounding more than 10 others.

Improved Antichemical, Antinuclear Capabilities

*OW1410224190 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1218 GMT 14 Oct 90*

[By reporter Qi Hanxiao (7871 0698 4562); local broadcast news service]

[Text] Beijing, 14 October (XINHUA)—The Chinese Air Force has attained a new level in its capacity to fight under the conditions of nuclear contamination and chemical warfare.

According to a responsible person of the anti-chemical warfare department of the Air Force, a new training course against chemical warfare has been drawn up in its initial form by the People's Air Force. The radiation-measuring meter developed by this department can be carried on aircraft flying at medium and low speed to measure the radiation rate over a large area. It can also be used to detect and monitor radiation in the air and on the ground under emergency conditions of nuclear accidents. This is of great importance in raising the capacity for rapid reaction against chemical warfare and ensuring safety in the case of nuclear accidents. The respiratory tract protector has filled a gap in our Air Force—lack of protection of the pilot's respiratory tract against attack by chemicals. The development of the airborne yield-measuring meter has put an end to China's history of having no airborne instrument for measuring nuclear explosions. It has provided our Air Force with an instrument to determine quickly the force of nuclear explosions. Now, the anti-chemical mobile unit of the Air Force can carry out airborne operations, which are quick and can cover a large area. It quickly can transport troops and main technical equipment from a fairly distant place to the battlefield or the nuclear accident area to ensure safety against chemicals or do emergency rescue work in nuclear accidents as assigned by the state.

Stand on Disarmament Stressed to UN First Committee

*OW1810005890 Beijing XINHUA in English
0029 GMT 18 Oct 90*

[Text] United Nations, October 17 (XINHUA)—Chinese Ambassador Hou Zhitong today told the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly that China, which has consistently opposed the arms race, stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, space, chemical and biological weapons and for a drastic reduction of conventional weapons.

He reaffirmed that China, which has never evaded its responsibility in nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states at any time and under any circumstances.

He emphasized that the key to realizing nuclear disarmament, which remains on the top of the disarmament agenda, lies in the superpowers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

"They must discharge in real earnest their special responsibilities by taking the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing at an early date all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home or abroad," the Chinese ambassador said.

He believed that all bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms control and disarmament should contribute to the maintenance of peace and security of the whole world and should not jeopardize the security interest of other countries and regions.

Therefore, he said, all troops thus reduced should be demobilized and the armaments thus cut should be destroyed, without being transferred to or re-deployed in other countries.

On the question of prevention of nuclear proliferation, the Chinese official said that China is of the view that the prevention itself is not the ultimate goal, but a step on the process of effecting complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

"If one were to impose, on the excuse of prevention of nuclear proliferation, all kinds of limits on the legitimate activities of non-nuclear countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy while evading his own responsibility for nuclear disarmament," the ambassador said, the non-proliferation regime would be undermined.

He declared again that China would not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear-weapon proliferation and not to help other countries develop nuclear weapons.

On reduction of conventional weapons, he said that all states should refrain from seeking armaments exceeding their defense requirements, and that any country must in no way be engaged in armed aggression or intervention against other countries.

He said that the countries with colossal chemical arsenals should take special responsibility, and that the complete and thorough destruction of chemical weapons is the key to the success of the on-going negotiations on a convention on the ban of all chemical weapons.

AUSTRALIA

Academic: U.S. Abandons Plans on Chemical Arms

BK1810100990 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] An Australian academic claims the United States military has abandoned plans to incinerate chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Professor (Neil Foster) of the University of New South Wales said the facilities at the atoll were outdated. During a recent trip to Britain to outline alternative plans to disposing of dangerous waste, Prof. (Foster) said he learned that American authorities no longer favored the burning of chemical weapons. He quoted sources in the American Army Research Office as saying they believed that the high temperature incinerator on Johnston Atoll would never be used.

Prof. (Foster's) trip to Britain was sponsored by the Western military alliance, NATO.

JAPAN

Nation To Sign Chemical Weapons Ban Protocol

OW1810144990 Tokyo KYODO in English 1325 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Tokyo, October 18 (KYODO)—Japan intends to sign a convention for a universal ban on chemical weapons that is now being worked out in the United Nations, Foreign Ministry officials said Thursday.

Officials said Japan formally made the commitment in a speech delivered Wednesday at the UN Headquarters in New York by Mitsuro Donowaki, Japan's ambassador to the international body. Donowaki was quoted as calling for an early conclusion of the proposed convention, calling it "a matter of great importance and urgency."

The global and effectively verifiable convention would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, and use of all chemical weapons and would require their destruction.

Officials said the ambassador welcomed as a concrete step toward that goal last June's signing of a U.S.-Soviet treaty providing for the destruction of most chemical weapons stockpiles in the two countries and a halt to their further production. But he said that the international negotiations being carried on among some 40 UN member states have since stalled on several crucial questions, including verification.

Donowaki said that "strong political will" on the part of the negotiating parties is "indispensable" if a breakthrough in the talks is to be achieved.

"It would naturally be too much to expect to establish a 100 percent foolproof verification mechanism," the envoy said. He called on the negotiating parties to agree

instead to a more realistic mechanism "that is both effective and reasonably reliable," officials said.

Negotiators, based at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, are also sparring over such other issues as the mode of destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles and the establishment of an executive council, which would be charged with observing the implementation of the treaty.

Officials said that Japan, meanwhile, considers it important to ensure that all of the chemical weapons "suspect countries," most of them located in the Third World, become members of the protocol. The three countries that have openly admitted possessing chemical weapons are the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq, but U.S. sources are said to point to over 20 "suspect countries."

Donowaki was also quoted as saying in New York that Japan hopes that an ongoing study by a group of UN experts on the question of the transfer of conventional weapons will produce useful conclusions. Officials said he was referring to a study group set up in 1988 to investigate means of ensuring greater transparency and openness in that field, which is expected to submit its conclusions at next year's UN General Assembly session.

In the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait with the aid of massive amounts of foreign weaponry, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama called at the UN last month for "strengthened global arrangements" against the proliferation of conventional armaments and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. But officials here acknowledged that an effective and practical control regime would be difficult to establish.

One official said that in the present Persian Gulf situation, where the U.S. is reinforcing Saudi Arabia's military strength, it might not even be desirable.

Officials noted that when Japan tried in the 1970's to submit a draft resolution calling for a comprehensive study on the nature of global arms transfers, the draft was shot down before it could even reach a vote due to strong opposition from major Third World countries such as India.

KIRIBATI

Plan To Ask Bush To Help End Nuclear Tests

BK1810032490 Hong Kong AFP in English 0133 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Wellington, October 18 (AFP)—Pacific leaders will ask U.S. President George Bush to pressure France to stop nuclear testing in the South Pacific, Kiribati's President Ieremia Tabai said here Thursday.

Mr. Bush is to meet with 13 Pacific leaders, including Mr. Tabai, in Hawaii on October 27.

"With the easing of tension between East and West, it will be a good opportunity to talk to the Americans about applying pressure on the French," he said.

Mr. Tabai said it was understandable that France wanted nuclear capabilities but the rationale was now less valid given the end of the cold war.

France conducts five or six underground nuclear tests annually at its test site at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. Pacific nations, through the South Pacific Forum, have repeatedly asked Paris to stop.

On the planned destruction of German-based chemical and nerve gas weapons on Johnston Island, 1,130 kilometres (700 miles) south of Hawaii, Mr. Tabai said he believed the president knew of the Pacific's opposition and had assured them the site would only be used for the German weapons.

"My preference is the chemicals should not be coming from Europe (but) we have to accept now there is no way we are going to change the mind of the Americans," he said.

"They are committed to the programme. The best position is to hold the Americans to their word, that this will be a one-off," Mr. Tabai said. "We do not want it to be a permanent site."

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Production of Stealth Bomber Assailed

*SK1810104390 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1023 GMT 18 Oct 90*

["Act Going Against Trend of the Times"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, October 18 (KCNA)—U.S. Congress formally decided of late to produce the "B-2 Stealth" bomber. This clearly indicates that the United States intends to rush headlong along the road of arms buildup in fiscal 1991. MINJU CHOSON today says this in a by-lined commentary.

The United States, it notes, decided to start the production of the new-type bomber that had been shelved, when the desire for peace is running higher and arms cut is under way in the international arena. This exposes once

again that "peace" and "disarmament" they have loudly cried for each time an opportunity presented itself are an empty talk.

The United States is getting more feverish in developing new-type weapons including nuclear weapons this year. The U.S. rulers are going ahead with the modernisation of nuclear weapons, openly crying that the present time is "an era of strength" and "nuclear superiority is requisite to victory in the confrontation with socialism."

On the 12th, the U.S. imperialists carried out one more nuclear test, bringing the number of the nuclear tests entering this year to seven.

On the other hand, they are putting spurs to the production of latest-type weapons.

Our people join the world peace-loving people in strongly denouncing the United States for adding wings to production of ultra-modern weapons including nuclear weapons.

The United States should not pay lip-service to "peace," "detente" and "disarmament," but carry them into practice.

SOUTH KOREA

Defense Ministry 'Arms Control Department' To Be Established

*SK2010064290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0621 GMT
20 Oct 90*

[Text] Seoul, October 20 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Defense Ministry said Saturday it will set up an arms control department and a research center in preparation for arms reduction talks with North Korea. The Ministry will absorb the Office of Arms Control, currently attached to the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and create an arms control research center to improve the handling of disarmament policy, an official at the Defense Ministry said.

The Ministry will also reorganize to effectively carry out six major projects, including the Korean fighter plan, and deal with arms control issues, he said. The reorganization is expected to take effect next January, after a presidential decree is revised.

Also to be created are a bureau of security cooperation to step up international security cooperation, especially with the United States, and a defense technology information center, which will come under the Defense Science Research Institute, he said.

BULGARIA

Deputy Foreign Minister Views Pact Forces-Levels Talks

AU1710105790 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 15 Oct 90 p 4

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Enyo Savov by Senior Lieutenant Krasimir Uzunov; place and date not given: "From Combat Fraternity to Political Cooperation"—first four paragraphs are NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] What is going to be the future of the Warsaw Pact? What guarantees for its national security will Bulgaria have after its military functions are terminated? What is reasonable sufficiency in reducing our Armed Forces and weapons when we take into consideration the fact that we are not located in Central Europe but at the southern flank, and moreover at the line of direct contact! Will we feel as secure tomorrow as we were until yesterday, despite the fact that we were burdened by ideological dogmas?

We do not have to hide anything—these are some of the questions with which we shall greet the signing of the final document of the Vienna talks in Paris on 19-20 November. These questions have been prompted by our tense daily life, the political confrontation, and the striving to bind our national interests to specific political gains.

In the days before the 3-4 November Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, which will clarify these questions to a large degree, we are publishing the opinions of our military experts and diplomats in several consecutive issues of our newspaper.

Today Enyo Savov, deputy minister of foreign affairs and long-time leader of the Bulgarian delegation to the talks on limiting arms and armed forces, answers questions of a representative of our editorial board.

[Uzunov] Mr. Savov, what is the state of the talks between the Warsaw Pact member states on determining the quotas of the Armed Forces of each of them?

[Savov] The regular session of the Warsaw Pact Special Commission on disarmament took place last week in Prague. The task was to set the level of the weapons that will remain in the separate countries after the limitations based on the Vienna talks go into effect. The commission's work is taking place within the Warsaw Pact and it is preparing for the successful signing of the Paris Treaty in November.

Three meetings have taken place up to now—the first was in Bratislava and there were two in Prague. The levels of combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and the ground forces' combat vehicles have been coordinated. The quotas for tanks and artillery remain open—33.30

percent sufficiency for tanks and 34.70 percent sufficiency for the artillery. These quotas will be discussed at the next meeting, on 26 and 27 October in Prague.

[Uzunov] What is the source of the difficulties at the talks?

[Savov] The difficulties come from many directions. The sufficiency percentage for several kinds of weapons in some of the countries is different. The components of national security for a country are also different for every country. At the same time the allies' obligations are decreasing.

Hungary's geostrategic situation is such that it is prepared to lower its quotas even more. On the other hand, the creation of a unified German state prompted Poland and Czechoslovakia to request an increase in their quotas. Bulgaria, Romania, and the USSR have the most acute problems.

We already have an agreement in principle that by the end of 1991 the military organization of the Warsaw Pact will cease to exist.

During the talks there is an argument virtually about every military unit. Every country has the right to protect its national interests. Our delegation also had a similar approach. It defends the issue of the quantity of weapons our country needs in order to maintain a normal balance of power with our neighbors. In order to be able to rely on an adequate response on the part of the Bulgarian People's Army in the event of a military conflict, it is necessary to maintain a ratio of 1:2 in favor of the enemy.

[Uzunov] How was the last USSR-U.S. disarmament agreement, also known as the Shevardnadze-Baker agreement, received?

[Savov] The New York agreement gives a certain advantage to the USSR where the sufficiency percentage has been finally fixed. The agreement was contested by other countries and it has been proposed that the agreement be reviewed.

[Uzunov] Can we seek the future of the Warsaw Pact in its past?

[Savov] Undoubtedly, the future of the Warsaw Pact is related to its past. It would be unrealistic to separate them. The new relations of the USSR with the other members of the organization produced new relations among the organization members themselves. It was not by accident that a group of representatives was established which is working to develop new visions about the Warsaw Pact and the future of mutual relations within the pact. I repeat—the pact's future lies in political cooperation. Military cooperation will not only become secondary, but will probably disappear.

[Uzunov] How would you comment on the separatist tendencies within the Pact?

[Savov] Much has been said and written about separatist tendencies within the Warsaw Pact, but it is too early to say anything definite. For the time being only Hungary has declared its intention to leave the Pact.

[Uzunov] Are there contradictions among the allies?

[Savov] I would not call them contradictions. The processes that are now developing in the East European countries are more or less identical. I do not think that they will lead to antagonistic contradictions between the former allies.

[Uzunov] Are there any differences in setting the quotas for the countries of the southern flank?

[Savov] The issue of the regional quotas has not been fully clarified at the Vienna talks. It has not been established what Soviet military okrugs will be classified as being a part of the southern flank, and what okrugs will not be classified as such. There is a great dispute about the Kiev military okrug. There is an agreement that the number of tanks on the southern flank will be 4,700. For the Warsaw Pact, these will be the tanks of the Soviet military okrugs (which have been determined), Romania, and Bulgaria, while for NATO the tanks of Turkey and Greece. There is an additional agreement between the USSR and the United States on adding 600 tanks to each flank.

[Uzunov] Against the background of everything that has been said so far, how would you comment on the position of Turkey and its declaration that it will not reduce its Armed Forces and weapons?

[Savov] If Turkey withdraws the necessary amount of troops from Europe, it can refrain from any reductions. However, its quota will also be fixed both at the national and regional levels. A system of inspections will be worked out in order to control the implementation of the agreement and guarantee security.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Foreign Minister Appeals to Pact Not To Block CFE Agreement

*LD1710090990 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0800 GMT 17 Oct 90*

[Text] Jiri Dienstbier, minister of foreign affairs, has strongly appealed to his allies in the Warsaw Pact not to block the Paris summit next month, the subject of which

is to be the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. He told a British correspondent that the democracies in Eastern Europe should not be responsible for blocking an agreement on conventional disarmament [CFE]. There is disagreement within the Warsaw Pact, however, on the question of the distribution of tanks which complicates the final text of an agreement due to be signed at a summit meeting of signatory countries of the Helsinki conference.

New Commission on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Meets

*LD1910043190 Prague CTK in English 2253 GMT
18 Oct 90*

[Text] Prague, October 18 (CTK)—The new parliamentary commission supervising the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia today started its work.

Unlike that which worked until the June 9 elections, it is composed in addition of deputies to the Federal parliament also of deputies to the Czech and Slovak National Councils, supreme national legislative bodies.

The new commission is chaired by Federal Assembly Deputy Michael Kocab.

In addition to seeing to the observance of the timetable of withdrawal, the commission will deal with contamination of underground waters and of soil, and will initiate quick drafting of an agreement on ways of compensation of the damage caused by the Soviet Army in Czechoslovakia over the past 22 years. (The Soviet troops have been in Czechoslovakia since a Soviet-led invasion crushed the revival process in the country in 1968.)

Czechoslovakia is the only country on which the Soviet Union has not exerted economic pressure in connection with its departure.

It was announced by the commission that 58 per cent of the 73,500 Soviet troops and 53.4 per cent of their family members have thus far left Czechoslovakia, and that 78 per cent of tanks and 82 per cent of planes have been withdrawn.

After October 22, when the withdrawal of a Soviet helicopter regiment from Sliac, Central Slovakia, will end there will be no Soviet combat helicopter in Czechoslovakia.

CHILE

Arms Factory Reportedly Working on FAE Bombs

PY1210125990 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish
1816 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Santiago, 12 October (REUTER)—The Chilean arms manufacturer who sold cluster bombs to Iraq during its war with Iran today reported that it is developing an explosive device that military experts believe to be up to five times as destructive as conventional bombs.

Cardoen Industries told REUTER that it is experimenting with a "fuel-air explosive" [preceding two words in English] (FAE) bomb, a device that releases, upon impact, a cloud of fuel that explodes in a ball of fire once it reaches a critical density.

The Chilean arms manufacturer, however, denied having manufactured this type of bomb for Iraq. The statement delivered to REUTER indicates that tests carried out in Chile's northern desert are not convincing enough to start manufacturing the bomb yet.

"This project is now at the stage of preliminary studies. Static tests with various combinations of explosives and detonating substances are being conducted to obtain the FAE effect," Cardoen reported.

"We are not yet ready to produce a prototype of a FAE bomb, less still have we launched a marketing strategy for this product," the statement said. The company added that it is not planning to produce the bomb jointly with any other country.

FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, a specialized British magazine reported on Wednesday that Iraq was developing the FAE bomb for use in a missile warhead. Quoting Western intelligence sources, the magazine reported that Iraq obtained the necessary technology while participating in the aborted Condor missile project together with Argentina and Egypt. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL also reported that a missile warhead armed with a FAE bomb would be much more dangerous for Saudi Arabian oil fields than chemical weapons.

Government Orders Investigation Into FAE, CW Charges

Charges Denied

PY1810211490 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1955 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] Santiago, 18 October (AFP-NA)—Defense Minister Patricio Rojas reported in Santiago today that Chile does not have chemical weapons [CW] and that Patricio Aylwin's government has ordered an "in-depth" investigation into the alleged shipment of a high-power Chilean bomb to the Persian Gulf.

The FAE [fuel-air explosive] bomb is not included in Cardoen Armament Industry's production plans, the

private company said on 15 October when denying reports from London charging the firm with manufacturing this type of minor atomic bomb [as received] for sale to Iraq through Libya.

The charges were also denied by the Libyan Government on 16 October. Peruvian Defense Minister General Jorge Torres, however, viewed the news with "great concern," while Bolivian Defense Minister Hector Ormachea accused Chile of starting "a nuclear arms race."

Peru is currently holding talks with Chile on reducing military spending, while Bolivia severed diplomatic relations with the former Chilean regime of General Augusto Pinochet 12 years ago when its efforts to obtain a Pacific Ocean sea outlet failed.

The concern of both nations increased with a report from Buenos Aires saying that Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo mentioned Chilean "war prowess" and the development of chemical weapons.

Argentine Ambassador to Santiago Oscar Spinoza denied yesterday that Cavallo had made such remarks, adding that there are no "contingency war plans" that include Chile and Argentina.

The Chilean defense minister said today that according to information gathered by organizations that supervise the Armed Forces, Chile is not carrying out any tests or programs with chemical weapons.

As for the private weapons industry, particularly Cardoen, the minister said an "in-depth investigation," which "will clearly determine that nothing of the kind exists," will conclude this week.

The investigation will also establish whether Cardoen is still operating in the Persian Gulf region. In recent years, before the end of the Iraq-Iran war, Cardoen supplied cluster bombs to Iraq.

Foreign Ministry on FAE Reports

PY1910003890 Santiago Domingo Service in Spanish
2200 GMT 18 Oct 90

[Text] The government has categorically denied that the state or any of its civilian or military organizations have manufactured or stored high-power chemical bombs or similar weapons. This was revealed a few minutes ago by Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma through an official Foreign Ministry communique as follows:

In view of reports by foreign journalists that Chile or its military institutes have manufactured or stored powerful chemical weapons similar in power to nuclear bombs, which would tilt the Armed Forces balance of power in our favor when compared to that of our neighbors, the Foreign Ministry is duly authorized by the president of the Republic to state:

1. It is categorically denied that the state or any of its civilian or military organizations have manufactured or stored war materiel of the nature indicated.

2. In the event that private companies which manufacture weapons were found to be producing or researching to produce such weapons, or in violation of current legislation on the matter, the government, through the Defense Ministry's supervisory organizations, which are carrying out an investigation, will immediately implement the appropriate corrective measures.

The official Foreign Ministry communique concludes by saying that in any case, national manufacturers of war materiel have emphatically and publicly denied producing bombs such as those mentioned.

INDIA

Government To Control Dual-Purpose Chemicals

BK2010155890 Delhi ISI Diplomatic Information
Service in English 0910 GMT 20 Oct 90

["Official Spokesman's Statement dated 13 10 90 Regarding Control on Export of Dual Purpose Chemicals Which Can Be Used To Manufacture Chemical Weapons"—ISI headline]

[Text] The government is to put into operation a system of control to manufacture chemical weapons [CW]. It has established a list of chemicals export which will require prior clearance of the government. A detailed procedure has been instituted for this purpose. In doing so, it has taken care to ensure that the normal business and trade of the concerned industries is not hindered. The second important aspect of the government's decision is the implementation of a system of verification of the manufacture and export of specific dual purpose chemicals through data reporting by the concerned Indian firms and monitoring of that data by the government. In keeping with its firm commitment to completely abolish chemical weapons, India is the only country which has set into motion a system to verify compliance with non-production of chemical weapons as part of the regime for a future CW convention. The list of dual purpose chemicals have been prepared according to the guidelines being determined by the conference on disarmament in Geneva and taking into account the structure of the chemical industry in India.

MAURITANIA

Foreign Minister Denies Presence of Iraqi IRBM's

AB1810090490 Paris AFP in English 0424 GMT
18 Oct 90

[Text] Paris, October 18 (AFP)—The foreign minister of the north African state of Mauritania, one of the few to have remained allied with Iraq since it invaded Kuwait, on Wednesday denied rumours that it had allowed Iraqi missiles and troops to be stationed on its territory.

"There are no Iraqi troops in Mauritania, and the story of the missiles is part of an anti-Iraqi campaign dating from before the invasion of Kuwait," Hasni Ould Didi told the Arab-language daily AL-HAYAT in an interview published on Wednesday in London and Paris.

U.S. officials have confirmed to Mauritania that their satellites had not picked up any signs of such a military presence, Mr. Ould Didi said.

The minister also said that his country condemned the use of violence in conflicts between states.

Mauritania had "cordial and brotherly relations with Iraq," but "that does not mean that we accept, or will accept, the annexation of Kuwait," he said.

If Iraqi ballistic missiles were to be installed in Mauritania, they would be capable of hitting targets in western Europe.

Moscow ABM System's Role in Deterrence Viewed*91UM0009A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Oct 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "A Bridle for the Nuclear 'Racers,' or What the Antiballistic Missile Defense System Represents"]

[Text] On 27 September, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA acquainted readers with the missile attack warning system [BMEWS] that is available in the USSR Armed Forces. We continue to inform our readers about strategic deterrence weapons. Today's article is about the ABM system.

It is the summer of 1953. The Soviet Union learns that the United States is testing a ballistic missile that will deliver a nuclear weapon to a target. If the testing is successful, the USSR will be defenseless in face of the American military machine. And, in August, seven marshals of the Soviet Union, headed by Chief of the General Staff Vasily Danilovich Sokolovskiy, send a letter to the CPSU Central Committee with a request to examine the question of creating an antimissile defense system.

Scientific authorities greeted the idea with a considerable share of skepticism. One academician said outright: "To hit a bullet with a bullet and a needle with a needle in outer space is simply impossible, and only eccentrics could undertake the resolution of such a task. The eccentrics were found—young scientists—the developers of surface-to-air missile systems and, first and foremost, the 35-year old Doctor of Technical Sciences Grigoriy Kisunko. They were so bold as to substantiate the principles of antimissile defense: How to find a small speeding target in outer space, how to track it effectively, and, finally, how to guide the antimissile missile. A resolution appeared in a letter of the seven marshals: "The problem is complex, and a task has been given to begin its study."

Three years of intensive work by the scientists, headed by Grigoriy Kisunko, gave such results that a decision followed to create a test range. The first detachment of military builders headed by Colonel A. Gubenko—he managed construction until 1962—landed in the rocky, waterless desert of Betpak-Dana on 8 July 1956. There was intensive work by industrial scientists and by leaders of the Ministry of Defense who were charged with working on the antimissile defense program. And so it is 4 March 1961.

An antimissile missile with a nonnuclear (high explosive fragmentation) warhead destroyed the nose cone of the R-12 ballistic missile. At one of the press conferences, N.S. Khrushchev, who liked to use figurative expressions, informed the journalists: "Our missile, it can be said, will hit a fly in outer space."

For soldiers of antimissile defense, that day was historic. It was tense and nerve-racking. The equipment was checked, starting in the morning, and the missile launch command was given to Kapustin Yar. But there and then there was a stand down—there was a prohibition on all types of radiation. Counterintelligence reported: There are foreigners in a train on a nearby railroad, and electronic surveillance is possible. Agonizing hours of waiting. Finally, the R-12 was launched in the second half of the day. Its blip could be seen on the screen clearly. And suddenly there is interference on the radar screen. However, the operational team was able to finish the job. The target was destroyed. This was a great success—the Americans conducted the first nonnuclear destruction of a ballistic missile 23 years later.

The further development of U.S. nuclear forces and the appearance of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads required the creation of a multichannel ABM system with the employment of more effective antimissile missiles. Such a system was created in 1972.

A powerful breakthrough in equipment and in the creation of antimissile defense systems compelled the leadership of the United States to seek ways to conclude a Treaty on Limitations on Antimissile Defense. Of course, there were also other weighty reasons for this.

"The ABM system was established in the 1950's and the 1960's at the very height of the 'cold war,'" says Colonel General V. Kraskovskiy, one of the leaders of the Air Defense Troops. Catching our breath from the race and getting our bearings, both we and the Americans realized that the establishment of an antimissile defense system, even if not for the entire country but only for the main strategic areas, is an expensive and ineffective undertaking. Why? Let us suppose that for the destruction of a nominal area the Americans plan to launch 10 ballistic missiles. We cover this with 50-60 antimissile missiles. Tomorrow, the Americans then aim 20 missiles at it. We would again have to increase the number of antimissile missiles, and so on, ad infinitum—a classic model of the arms race. Both sides came to realize that it was necessary to sit behind a negotiating table. In 1972, a treaty was signed between the USSR and the United States, under which each side was permitted to have only one area on its territory that has an ABM defense. The radius of the area of deployment of the ABM system must not exceed 150 kilometers. The Americans decided to cover the strategic missile base at Grand Forks in the north of the country, and we—our capital.

The Americans mothballed their "Safeguard" system, but its main link—the "PAR" [phased array radar] was kept to stand watch in the interests of their nuclear missile strike warning system. Moreover, they are continuously improving ABM equipment and are conducting scientific research and test design work, and they are acting in a way that, should it become necessary, they would be able to deploy their combat complexes in a short time.

Our system is operational. It was decided that it was not economical to toss away that which was created with enormous effort. Organizationally, it is part of the Air Defense Troops of the country. It consists of a command post and a powerful multi functional detection and guidance radar system and units of firing complexes with antimissile missiles.

I am standing at the edge of a silo.

There it is, a cone-shaped cigar that is many meters long.

"In some ways it is like a ballistic missile," says Lieutenant Colonel V. Syzov, the commander of the firing complex.

He entered the time in his notebook—1736 hours, and the date, 17 July 1990. A small historical fact—the first journalist to descend into a silo of the ABM system. Senior Lieutenant Timchenko talked about the instruments that control the missile. They report all of the data about it to the command post, about "how it feels," about what the humidity and temperature are in the end section. Why? So that no complications would occur during launch. It will take seconds for everything. A solid propellant engine will begin to work, it will suddenly remove the cover, and a powerful thrust will hurl the missile out of the silo. The radar site will take over guidance of the missile to the target.

"We have full confidence, corroborated by range tests and a long period of operations, in the technical reliability of the system and in the execution of its task to destroy unsanctioned and single ballistic missiles whose employment could be used to provoke a nuclear missile war," says Colonel V. Malikov, who has devoted more than 20 years to the development and formation of the ABM system.

How does the antimissile defense system work? Now, in peacetime, it is in a state of continuous readiness, it "listens" and "looks over" outer space with the help of the multi functional station. If an aggressor undertakes a missile attack, the ABM system, with the help of the missile attack warning system, or independently, is capable of determining the fact of aggression and going over to automatic tracking of ballistic targets. The electronic brain of the system (a super computer) selects nuclear warheads from simulators, and it indicates the dangerous ones. At the same time, in an automatic mode, it brings the antimissile missiles to a readiness stage, distributes them according to targets, calculates the predicted point of destruction, and gives the launch command at the most favorable moment. At first, antimissile missiles of the first intercept level speed upward, and then interceptors of the second level will strike the warheads of those ballistic missiles that were not destroyed by the first. And during the entire time of flight of the antimissile missile, the electronic brain will direct them through a powerful radar to engage the target.

And what role in this fast-acting process (an antimissile battle lasts minutes) does the human being play? Will he not get lost in the functionally interconnected world of automation and electronics?

"No," V. Malikov answers firmly. "The more complicated the equipment, the more it requires attention on the part of a human being, because it cannot function by itself. And if a malfunction occurs... The human being is the most reliable backup system."

After completing my official trip, I tried to sketch a typical portrait of an officer of antimissile defense. I was unable to do it. There are those at the sites who are approaching 50 years of age. They have a lot of work and responsibility, but the younger people also do not yield in this. For example, the deputy chief of one of the weapons centers went on leave—Captain V. Yakovlev took over. About a hundred officers came under his supervision. He handled it.

There are people who heard about the ABM system for the first time when they became officers, and there are... During a visit to a firing subunit of the complex, I became acquainted with V. Vlasov. His great-grandfather defended Port Arthur as an artillery man in the Russo-Japanese War, his grandfather fought in the Great Patriotic War, and his father died in 1966 during a missile launch at Baykonur.

Families also serve in the system (more accurately, serve the system). Lieutenant Colonel V. Novikov, the radar facility deputy chief engineer, began his working life in the city of Dubno of Rovno Oblast as a lathe operator, and he learned about the ABM as a cadet in a military academy. Now his wife and son can also consider themselves in some measure as antimissile personnel. Yelena Alekseyevna—a corporal—is a system operator, and Aleksey, after graduating from a professional technical school, works as an equipment repair expert. In short, an entire dynasty is projected, if "daughter Natasha, our youngest, a schoolgirl, does not let us down." The head of the family is one of the experienced specialists. He graduated from a military school and an academy in his professional field, and he took part in operational antimissile missile launches on a state test range.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Belov—who gave 18 years of service to it—can also be categorized as a real student of the ABM system. Now the deputy chief of the radar site—the most powerful facility in the ABM system—his military career, it can be said, has advanced. Smart, strict, sharp, and modern in his opinions, he is up to the job he is in.

There are all kinds of people... Colonel N. Parshin, as an engineer, very positively assessed the activity of enterprises of the Ministry of Radio Industry, and at the same he spoke with state concern about the low reliability of individual types of products and equipment that are produced by its enterprises. As corroboration, he demonstrated gears and bushings, and other parts for pumps and for cooling assemblies that arrived with plant

defects. But political worker Viktor Grebenshchikov has other concerns that are no less important. People come to him who are tired of waiting for an apartment, for a place in a kindergarten for a child... But how can you help when to meet the needs it is necessary to build two dwellings, a school, a kindergarten-nursery, a communications center, a motor pool, and many other things. The building plan that was approved in April 1987 is being fulfilled with delays.

Yes, a backward social and everyday living sphere exists alongside modern electronic equipment. Why? Priority was given and is being given now to combat equipment. Specialists told me that system facilities cost millions of rubles. Colonel N. Parshin answered my question this way: "Yes, the system has cost the country a lot. What had an effect here is that almost every item is unique. But, as the saying goes, the game is worth the candle. Across the ocean, the production line is putting out increasingly improved ballistic missiles—MX, 'Trident-2,' 'Midget Man.' But are not the missiles of other Western countries also aimed at our country? Of course, there must be a shield. We are not immune from a provocative launch of a missile, either, at least judging from the development of the situation in the Near East. We eliminate one such mad missile—all expenditures will pay for themselves..."

'Outer Space Monitoring System' Service Examined

91UM0040A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Bridle for the Nuclear 'Racers,' or What the Space Monitoring System Represents"]

[Text] We are completing an article on strategic deterrence systems that are at the disposal of the USSR Armed Forces. (See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 27 September and 5 October.) Today's material is about the outer space monitoring system (SKKP).

Colonel V. Nikolskiy pointed to an enormous bay with displays and multicolored screens—the command post of the space monitoring system. He says look and study.

"From here we see practically the entire moving cosmos," he explained.

I familiarize myself with what yesterday was an inaccessible and top secret facility. Dozens of questions crop up. First: Why do we need this very modern and expensive all-seeing eye?

Colonel G. Kovsh, chief of the department who was keeping up the conversation, answers one question after another: "Do you know how many objects there are in outer space? More than 7,000 have been counted, active and inactive satellites.... We are talking about those that are placed in orbit. All told there are more than 20,000

flying objects—outer space is cluttered. Out there a very ordinary needle is capable of piercing a spacecraft and causing trouble. But the problem is not in the number—not all space apparatuses are harmless...."

He showed a short chronicle of recent reports from abroad.

"16 July. Pakistan launched its first Earth satellite vehicle, weighing 50 kilograms, from Chinese territory. According to the announcement of the prime minister, this is 'an important event on the road to the technological modernization of Pakistan.'

"1 August. A missile whose electronic components were undergoing testing in the air for the 'Star Wars' program went off course and was destroyed on a command from Earth. The destruction command came from the White Sands test range (state of New Mexico).

"4 August. A Delta-2 rocket was launched from the space center on Cape Canaveral. Its main objective—to put a Navstar system satellite into orbit—pursuant to a Pentagon program...."

"Different, very different satellites are being put into orbit, and they simply are real dragons. Once outer space becomes more dangerous, then we must know everything," says Viktor Nikolskiy, "or almost everything about each apparatus and object. These tasks surfaced as early as the beginning of the 1960's, and they were prompted by the placement of satellites into orbit that had a military purpose."

Like every new program, the system for monitoring outer space was born as they say with birth pangs. The original provision of space object tracking was accomplished through information obtained by optical systems of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Air Defense Troops, with the use of plotting boards and individual programs.... But with the passage of time this became inadequate. Powerful radars of the missile attack warning and the antimissile defense systems were linked up in the tracking of objects. The streams of information were transformed into a real river that was full-flowing and rapid. The question arose as to the speedy and effective processing of information. And so in 1970 a space tracking center began to be created. N. Buslenko, G. Ryabov, and their colleagues performed a great service in this.

A kind of personal file is kept on each high-flying "traveler"—it contains the satellite's coordinates, its capabilities, and its "behavior". A catalog is constructed from this kind of personal data. When the task arises to take a closer look at one or another space wanderer—for example, the U.S. reconnaissance satellite Ferret-D—the catalog helps find its location area quickly, and only then do the tracking complexes "tell" where it is located and give its characteristics. With what kind of accuracy? They explained it to me. Imagine that two soccer balls are flying at a distance of 10 centimeters from each other. We will say that there are two balls in orbit, and

not one. But this is a figurative comparison. There are also examples of specific work that attest to the professionalism of the collective.

September 1983. A South Korean Boeing-747 aircraft violated the state border of the USSR, intruded into our country, and was shot down by a Soviet fighter. People died, a tragedy occurred. The world had to be told who was responsible. The Soviet side presented evidence that the intrusion into our airspace was intentional. Perhaps the most convincing evidence was that presented by the space tracking center. The flight of the Boeing-747 was very carefully synchronized with the flight of a Ferret-D reconnaissance satellite. The space spy appeared over Chukotsk at 1845 on 1 September, and for a period of approximately 12 minutes it flew to the east of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands, monitoring Soviet electronic systems which were working in the normal mode. In the next orbit, the Ferret-D appeared over Kamchatka at exactly the moment of the intrusion of the encroaching aircraft, fixing the activity of our communications and electronic systems which were changing the intensity of their work. In the end, it was established that the third orbit coincided with absolute accuracy with the following third stage of the Boeing-747 over Sakhalin. The data presented to the public showed: Such an exact coincidence of the flight of the reconnaissance aircraft and the spy satellite cannot be explained away as accidental.

Mistakes must not be made in such cases. A tremendous responsibility is placed on equipment, and most of all on people. Who are they, the "controllers" of outer space?

The operations duty officer is Colonel V. Minayev. He is 49 years of age, has completed a military school and a military academy, and is married and has children. He is from the Kharkov area. Lieutenant Colonel Ya. Tsymbalistyy, a member of the team, also comes from the Ukraine. "I also have a connection with the Ukraine," says Major N. Davydov. "I graduated from a military school there."

A lot can be told about each of them. Take Yaroslav Tsymbalistyy. He has been here since the beginning. He assembled the electronic apparatus of the automated control system—specialists from the manufacturing plant were amazed: Where did such knowledge come from, and such skill?—he studied it, and now he is operating it. He can say with complete justification: "my center."

"Competence is the main thing that characterizes the officers of the center. Other specialists 'do not survive here,'" said Colonel V. Nikolskiy. He talked with pride about the fact that this year alone 20 medalists came here from military schools. "Very high knowledge and solid skills are the main requirement for holding conversations with outer space. An aspiring person next to wonderful equipment cannot help but grow...."

Incidentally, this is understood very well in the higher educational institutions and in the scientific research

institutes, and they eagerly invite officers who have worked well in the tracking center. They have more than one research work to their credit. Officers Yu. Gorobchuk, V. Zyubin, and M. Chernov recently defended their candidate dissertations.

"Is it difficult to be an officer in the SKKP?" I could not refrain from asking Minayev this banal question.

"Speaking for myself, it is difficult," he answered. "Today, the situation here is more or less quiet, but it is not always this way. For example, one of our tasks is to track space objects in the descent sector—we get precise information on the point of impact, and we issue information about this. And what are the satellites like now? There are those with nuclear equipment. When can they be expected? Where will the fragments fall...?"

Vladimir Minayev and his colleagues had occasion to worry some in the spring. It all started on the 8 March holiday. Four new fragments appeared in space. The analysis and data processing group reported: These are parts of a satellite that was put into orbit by the American spacecraft "Atlantis." It would seem it was nothing to worry about, but the object was not a simple one, and it was launched in the interests of the Pentagon—for visual and electronic intelligence, and its weight was 17 tons. Apparently the Americans blew it up because of defects. A precise answer had to be given: Where will the parts fall? Will they burn up completely in the atmosphere. The specialists did not err in their calculations. The first fragment burned up in the thick layers of the atmosphere on 19 March 1,500 kilometers to the north of Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean. They explained that the rest of the fragments do not represent a danger. Of course, their attention did not slacken until all of the fragments "died."

"There is also work with the manned spacecraft," explains Colonel Kovsh. "But we get involved only in an emergency situation. If an orbital station or a spacecraft is being guided, and close communication is being maintained with them, then here as the saying goes our job is on the sideline. But if a malfunction should occur, and the Mission Control Center 'loses' its envoys, then it cannot do without us...."

Grigoriy Kovsh showed TASS information appended to a file. "Several corrections in trajectory movement were made during the two-day automatic flight of the Soyuz T-13, as a result of which the spacecraft approached the Salyut-7 station at the prescribed distance. Further closing was executed by the crew manually with the use of a range determination apparatus and the onboard computer system." It was not reported then that Vladimir Dzhanibekov and Viktor Savinykh executed the docking with the silent station that was "lost" by Mission Control Center, and that they found it only with the data that was issued from here, from the space tracking center.

...Of course the collective does not live only with celestial distances. Here as in any garrison weddings are celebrated, apartments which are not in surplus are awaited impatiently, there is gossip about the shortage of commodities, there are holidays, and it is a blessing that the military facility is situated in a refreshing coniferous forest. But nevertheless, the main thing that determines everyone's mood is outer space, and more precisely monitoring it. When I tried to distract officers from discussions about work and to talk about everyday living matters, it did not always work out and they only steered away from the subject. They spoke with bitterness about the fact that frequently specialists from the space department took credit for the tracking center's work, and that they were being taken advantage of because of their secrecy. You see, no one else can spot falling fragments and pinpoint the coordinates of silent satellites....

Here in the tracking center they understand that the process of disarmament that has been started will not affect them—the outer space monitoring system will be needed even when there are no armies. The main concern is not to fall behind in the rapid exploration of outer space in order to secure their fellow citizens from various accidents. Indeed, the military danger from outer space has not been removed. On the days that I was in the tracking center, the Pentagon carried out a regular experiment in launching a powerful energy device within the framework of the "Star Wars" program. It appears that these warriors are assured this complex work for a long time. We will not shy away from giving credit to them for their unobtrusive work—so important and necessary in behalf of our security and peace—which for many years has been guarded by a curtain of secrecy.

Further on Greenpeace Protest on Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Testing

Demonstration at Berlin Embassy

AU1610123390 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
11 Oct 90 p 9

[Report by Nadja Roettger: "Environmental Activists Chained Themselves to Embassy"]

[Text] At 0930 hours yesterday morning, supporters of the Greenpeace organization chained themselves to the fence of the Soviet Embassy in Unter den Linden. Two other members locked themselves in a cage with the inscription: "Release the ship 'MS Greenpeace'—stop nuclear tests."

In this way, the environmental activists were protesting against the Soviet Navy, which stormed the Greenpeace ship 48 hours earlier that had entered the Soviet nuclear testing area. The "MS Greenpeace" is in the icy waters on the western coast of the Arctic island Novaya Zemlya in an attempt to prevent a nuclear test through its presence. On Monday [8 October] at five o'clock in the morning, 15 heavily armed Russian sailors of the "26th Party Congress" ice- breaker kicked in the door to the

ship's radio room and took over control. There has been no radio contact since then. Subsequently, a Greenpeace speed-boat with four activists on board entered the test zone. Contact was broken off with this boat as well.

"We will stay here until we know where our people are," Alois Vedder and Peter Gruetzmacher, two members of the Greenpeace office in Hannoversche Strasse who had chained themselves to the fence of the Soviet Embassy, stressed. "The ship is in the hands of the KGB. We want to be sure that the crew is not injured."

The antinuclear activist Robert Werner described the behavior of the USSR as a devaluation of the antinuclear-test campaign. This is a step back to the general policy of conciliation, he claimed.

In the afternoon the embassy announced that it has passed on the demands of Greenpeace to Moscow.

Greenpeace Representatives Explain Operation

PM1810150590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Greenpeace representatives A. Lapshin, L. Vorontsova, and Eleanor O'Hanlon; place and date not given: "Novaya Zemlya is a Dangerous Land"—first and last paragraphs are editorial comment]

[Text] Yesterday A. Lapshin and L. Vorontsova, Soviet representatives of the "Greenpeace" movement, and Eleanor O'Hanlon from Ireland, coordinator of the Novaya Zemlya landing project, spoke to the editorial office.

"Not everyone in the USSR has correctly understood our activity," they said. "'Greenpeace' believes that the USSR's position on the question of nuclear tests is positive and aimed at achieving a universal and total ban on them. Our organization's activity is also aimed at this.

"Our landing is a protest against plans to transfer nuclear weapons testing to Novaya Zemlya from the test range in Kazakhstan which is closing down by public demand. By the end of this year we intend to carry out analogous protest actions at test ranges in other nuclear states—in Mururoa and Nevada.

"Something about Novaya Zemlya. Over the years this island which was declared a military zone was used by the military in a completely uncontrolled fashion mainly to carry out tests. As is known, these tests were carried out in the atmosphere at first, and then underground. Any underground tests lead to a leak of radioactive material and the contamination of the island and surrounding water, and currents disperse the radiation throughout the whole world. Furthermore, over a period of many years, the restricted zone around Novaya Zemlya was used to bury radioactive waste from nuclear

power stations, nuclear submarines, and nuclear icebreakers. We were told, among other things, that the old reactors from the 'Lenin' nuclear icebreaker were buried in this region.

"That is exactly why the military authorities block every access to environmental organizations' ships in this area. We believe that the Novaya Zemlya area must be opened without fail and the environmental situation in this area must be studied thoroughly—perhaps all is not yet lost. 'Greenpeace' is prepared to make its ships and modern equipment available for this purpose.

"When we were preparing the landing on Novaya Zemlya, we wanted to act in accordance with Soviet laws and we sent a request to the official bodies (the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet) well in advance—two-and-one-half months ago—asking them to allow us to enter the Novaya Zemlya region. But the reply, which we received from the USSR Defense Ministry (No. 729-21/721 dated 25 September) says: "The Defense Ministry deems it inadvisable for foreign citizens using foreign ships to carry out any research on the territory of the test range and in the USSR's territorial waters and its area..." Then we took the responsibility upon ourselves. In addition, the participants in the activity became friends with Soviet border guards, many of whom were interpreted in our environmental concerns, although they were fulfilling their duty."

From the editorial office: The "Greenpeace" organization has sent materials on the landing in Novaya Zemlya and data from measurements of radiation and pollution to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. These will be published in the next few issues.

Greenpeace Account of Landing

PM2210093790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Oct 90 p 1

["Extract" from a "report...submitted to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" by participants in the Greenpeace expedition to Novaya Zemlya: "'Greens' Pretend To Be Stones"; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] How the Greenpeace expedition landed on Novaya Zemlya:

The landing party which disembarked from the Greenpeace ship on the island of Novaya Zemlya was in fact the first expedition of non-army scientists to come so close to a place where nuclear tests had previously been carried out (the last underground test was carried out 4 December 1988, according to Greenpeace information). Their observations confirmed their suspicions: There was pollution and radioactive leakage from the shaft and from cracks and fissures—over a year after tests were suspended.

We present an extract from the report which participants in the landing, G.N. Gormeyn [name as transliterated], D. Haye, T. Hood, and V. Yekern [name as transliterated] submitted to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

[Extract begins] From the coast we walked about one kilometer up a slope bearing northeast and we saw the old test range (it was not shown accurately on the map). At that moment we heard the noise of an engine and hid in a small crevice. The people in the car did not notice our tracks—we had tried to tread as lightly as possible....

...The cable stretching from Severnaya crossed a crevasse and was lost from view. One of its strands ran out along the empty buildings and another along the test range structures. And here our monitors started to pick up the signal: The counter showed 25 becquerels per square centimeter in and to the left of the abandoned area (note: 3 becquerels is already considered a high level). Nevertheless we crossed the hollow, heading south: 11 becquerels per square cm.

We also examined the shaft and the equipment. The level of pollution was high here too. On the slope we discovered three "hot spots" of up to 50 becquerels per square cm. They were located 300-400 meters from the shaft.

At 1430 the helicopter reappeared. We tried to hide among the rocks, but to no avail: The helicopter set down next to us.

The following things were taken away from us: instruments, cameras, film, respirators, a knife, a tape recorder, and so on. They put us in four cabins.

Everything was returned to us apart from the samples, film, and video recordings.

This is what we are now saying:

- 1) Why did the authorities take away our photographs and samples?
- 2) Our visit to a place with such a high level of pollution leads to the conclusion that there are problems with radioactivity on Novaya Zemlya.
- 3) The authorities must adopt a program to clean up the test range.
- 4) The authorities must not exacerbate things by continuing tests.

Incidentally: From a political statement by Major General A. Koltunov, chief of the political department of the Red Banner Northern Command and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy: "I demand a concrete decision—instead of wordy assurances—at republic and Union levels on a ban on expanding nuclear tests and the suspension of all work concerned with setting up new projects on the test range on Novaya Zemlya."

Soviet Peace Committee Apologizes to Greenpeace*LD2010031790 Moscow TASS in English 2052 GMT
19 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 19 (TASS)—The Soviet Peace Committee has expressed heartfelt regret over the incident with the Greenpeace vessel near Novaya Zemlya.

"We fully share your concern over the tragic ecological situation in the north of our country, which poses a moral threat not only to Soviet people, but also to all those living in that region and in the world in general," says a telegram sent by the committee to the international Greenpeace organisation.

"The implementation of plans of the Soviet military to revive a nuclear test site in Novaya Zemlya will lead to a dramatic deterioration of the ecological situation and, undoubtedly, to a new stage of the world arms race," the telegram pointed out. The Soviet Peace Committee was one of the organisations which successfully campaigned for a unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the tests were resumed, and the refusal of the United States and other nuclear powers to follow this example was one of the main reasons for it.

Now we are again working for a complete termination of all nuclear explosions, even on a unilateral basis. "At the same time, we realise that this idea will be supported by the broad public circles only if similar measures are taken by other nuclear powers," the Soviet Peace Committee pointed out.

CDE Military Inspectors Conclude Visit to Germany*PM1610142190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Oct 90 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "Inspection Over"]

[Text] A group of Soviet military inspectors completed their inspection of military activity on FRG territory 12 October.

The inspection took place in accordance with the relevant provisions of the document produced by the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe [CDE].

CFE Negotiations Seen 'Back on Schedule'*PM1810141690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Oct 90 Second Edition p 7*

["Observer's Opinion" by Yevgeniy Shashkov: "'Disarmament Express' Back on Schedule"]

[Text] At the beginning of October, everyone who has been following attentively the complex developments of the Helsinki process breathed a sigh of relief: The next all-European summit conference will be held after all. It will take place in Paris 19-21 November. This was confirmed at the meeting of CSCE foreign ministers

which ended in New York on 3 October. As already reported in the press, the leaders of the foreign policy departments of the 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada adopted two documents—the New York meeting communique and a statement on the Persian Gulf crisis—but most importantly, they approved the agenda of the forthcoming Paris conference.

I shall recall just a few of the main questions to be examined in the French capital. First and foremost, the signing of agreements on conventional arms reduction in Europe and on continuing talks in that area, as well as the opening of talks on tactical nuclear weapons; the approval of the declaration on the new principles of mutual relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the creation of a center for the prevention or solution of conflicts; and the adoption of a decision to create an all-European assembly, possibly based on the existing European Parliament.

Among the items on the agenda, I think that the treaty on conventional arms reduction in Europe is of special significance. As U.S. Secretary of State Baker reported at a briefing in the White House, this agreement sets arms limits for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For example, the limit for tanks is set at 20,000, as is the figure for artillery, the limit for armored combat vehicles is 30,000, and for helicopters 2,000.

In accordance with these "ceilings," any country belonging to either bloc may have combat hardware within the following limits: up to 13,300 tanks, up to 13,700 artillery pieces, up to 20,000 armored vehicles, up to 1,500 helicopters, and up to 5,150 warplanes. Expressed as a percentage of the total quantity of armaments in Europe, these "ceilings" represent 33 percent of the tanks, 34.3 percent of artillery, 33.3 percent of armored personnel carriers, and 37.5 percent of helicopters. "The Soviet Union," Baker stated, "will be bound by considerably greater commitments to destroy equipment than NATO or any of its members, including the United States. We will have to destroy 4,000 tanks in NATO. The Soviets or the Warsaw Pact, and let us talk about the Warsaw Pact, will have to destroy 19,000 tanks. The figures are similar in other categories and in some indicators they are even more in our favor..."

Such was the compromise reached during the New York talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker regarding the "ceilings" of the various conventional arms categories. And this was done, in the Soviet minister's words, so that the "disarmament train should make up the time lag that alarms us all and get back on schedule and will now arrive on time in Paris."

What was the West's reaction to events in New York? Enthusiastic, of course. As it indeed it should be, after all, thousands of Soviet tanks will be leaving Europe, tanks which were a "nightmare" for the West Europeans for many years. Commentaries are also dominated by

the idea that the "USSR has made considerable concessions to the West." Outwardly, that is precisely how it seems. Although, in my view, all that has happened is primarily a concession to common sense. After all, the treaty on conventional arms reduction (the USSR spends around 80 percent of its military budget on them) is a blessing not only for the West but for the Soviet Union, too.

Although, it seems to me, this compromise will inspire the most conflicting feelings among Soviet people. Indeed, there is food for thought here. In my view, the point is this: Why have our political decisions in foreign policy activity been lagging behind the development of international events recently, unlike in the first years of perestroika? Why do analyses of foreign policy processes hardly ever include such an important element as long-term forecasting, with the result that many international events catch us completely unawares? And why do we find it so difficult to make commonsense concessions on foreign policy?

Take the unification of Germany, for example. At the end of last year, many Germanists, including those in the Soviet Union, predicted the extraordinarily rapid process of unification. They believed that by fall 1990 or, more precisely, by the December elections in the FRG, the GDR would cease to exist. But our representatives, on whom the adoption of political decisions is very much dependent, continued to assert almost until spring that "unification will not happen all that quickly... It will most probably take several years."

In the organizational sphere, things sometimes happen which are hard to explain. It seemed an obvious fact that since the existence of the GDR is coming to an end, it will be necessary to view its international commitments and agreements as inoperative. In particular, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR, which has been in operation since 1975. At the beginning of September, the GDR Foreign Ministry took up this matter with the relevant USSR authorities. However, literally the day before German unification, our parliamentarians are confronted with the necessity to adopt the corresponding USSR Supreme Soviet resolution.

International life today demands different ideas on the time factor in politics. The time when diplomats could spend almost two decades at the negotiating table, as happened in Vienna, and then hand over to their sons who had since grown up in that period has disappeared into the past forever. The loss of momentum in the foreign policy process could have unpredictable results.

In my view, the political hypodynamics [gipodinamika] at the Vienna talks were the cause of the serious problems in organizing the Paris meeting. Let us recall: At the end of September the "disarmament express" was stuck in the Vienna siding. The U.S. representatives could not take the strain and began applying pressure, stating that

if a multilateral agreement on conventional arms was not ready for signing at the Paris conference, G. Bush would not go to France.

Of course, the pressure to which our partners in the talks resorted is not one of the best methods. But let us leave that to their conscience. We are primarily interested in how justified the USSR delegation's uncompromising stance was. Without going into details, that stance consisted in general terms of the following: The Soviet delegation insisted rigidly until very recently on a maximum "ceiling" of 40 percent of the total quantity of arms in Europe for the USSR while the NATO representatives insisted on 30 percent.

If the reports published in the Soviet and foreign press are to be believed, why did we continue defending in Vienna the usual ideas on the means of ensuring our security with a "reserve" of military strength instead of reaching a rational compromise? This contradicted our own strategic guideline on creating an all-European home in which all security problems will be resolved primarily by political rather than military methods. I do not think that the West will now be as vigorous in its efforts to undermine our security as it once was. The united Germany has consciously chosen to sharply limit its military potential. It seems to me that Western politicians are not so short-sighted as to artificially encourage a "Versailles syndrome" among the superpowers in the East.

From the military political viewpoint, the creation in Eastern Europe of a massive Soviet tank force and a powerful superiority in conventional arms and forces aimed against Western Europe was our asymmetric answer to the U.S. nuclear threat. But that confrontational logic was acceptable in the fifties and early sixties. Since then we have long had a counterthreat to U.S. territory and achieved parity in nuclear missiles. The question is: Today do we need even the semblance of a Soviet military threat to the states of the Old World? In my view the answer can only be no.

As for our own security, whether we like it or not, until military force as a means of maintaining peace is completely replaced by reliable guarantees in the political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental spheres, the USSR's nuclear potential will remain one of the main guarantees of its security. In my view, the tough approach is justified when discussing these problems and, of course, you must not go too fast. But that is for the future.

Today, though, one may state with satisfaction that thanks to the New York meeting, the "disarmament express" has gained the necessary speed. The treaty on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe is the first postwar agreement on conventional arms involving both the United States and the USSR. Thereby a complex stage which lasted 17 years on the difficult path toward the all-European home will be accomplished.

Grinevskiy Discusses Prospects for Vienna Talks*PM1710085190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Report by S. Tosunyan: "The Treaty on Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Europe: Paris Is Hurrying Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—Only a month remains until the start of the Paris meeting of CSCE countries' heads of state and government. Will the diplomats now working in Vienna succeed in preparing on schedule the meeting's main document—the draft treaty on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe? I asked this question of the leaders of several delegations at the talks. The reply was unambiguous: "We will succeed."

Until quite recently, nobody here spoke so optimistically. The talks were bogged down, with either one side or the other presenting more and more new conditions, consulting their governments, and awaiting instructions. But following the New York meeting of CSCE countries' foreign ministers and the series of talks between E. Shevardnadze and J. Baker, the Vienna forum's work changed completely: It picked up speed and became more precise and more businesslike.

O.A. Grinevskiy, ambassador on special assignment and head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna talks, returned a few days ago from New York, where he had joined the Soviet foreign minister's team. I asked him to share his impressions and to describe how the Vienna forum's last stage will proceed.

The pace of the Vienna talks process, Grinevskiy said, proved inadequate to keep up with the course of events in the European continent. Delegation experts approached the solution of problems primarily from the viewpoint of traditional military logic. As for the treaty being elaborated, it is essentially a document imbued with the new political thinking. If I had to describe the results of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue in New York in just a few words, the most suitable words would be the title of Hemingway's novel "A Farewell to Arms." More arms were probably destroyed during the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting than in any single battle throughout mankind's history.

The treaty's main point is the real reduction of armaments and equipment to equal maximum quantitative levels. There was success in New York in agreeing such levels for all categories subject to reduction for each of the alliances. These levels stand at 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored vehicles, 20,000 artillery units, and 2,000 attack helicopters.

Only a month ago we were guessing whether or not we would succeed in including in the treaty the question of incorporating combat aviation limitations and reductions. This problem has been solved now. All combat aircraft—including frontline aviation, medium-range bombers, anti-air defense fighter-interceptors, and

training combat aircraft—will be limited to maximum quantitative levels of 6,800 units for each alliance. This limit has been set at 5,150 units for the Soviet Union. The question of land-based naval aviation was the topic of acute debate in New York. It resulted in the adoption of a Soviet proposal that this question be solved via a politically binding declaration by both sides outside the treaty's framework.

Much attention was given at the New York talks to the zones problem [problema regionalnogo deleniya]. This is one of the key questions in the future treaty. Its essence is to establish a balance of forces not only throughout Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals but also in individual European subregions, ruling out any dangerous concentration of armaments there.

All participants in the Vienna talks are interested in the treaty being reliably monitorable. Until very recently, however, they had not reached agreement on what was to be monitored and the number of monitoring inspections each state will be entitled to. This problem was solved in New York.

And finally, the crowning glory is the actual process of reducing the armaments and equipment being limited under the treaty. Of course, armaments will be reduced primarily by destruction. But the Soviet Union intends to convert a proportion of this equipment and use it for peaceful purposes as bulldozers, cranes, and firefighting vehicles. A compromise has been reached, which boils down to this: The Vienna treaty will allow the conversion of 750 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles in the European part of the USSR. In accordance with the state conversion program, the remaining tanks and armored vehicles could be converted for peaceful use in the Asian part of the Soviet Union.

The accords reached in New York untangle all the remaining knots at the Vienna talks, leaving only the task of the final legal treaty formulation. Of course, the results of the New York meetings must be approved by all members of the two military-political alliances in Europe, and only then will they provide a basis for the final stretch in Vienna.

Petrovskiy Addresses UN First Committee on Disarmament*LD1710080790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2342 GMT 16 Oct 90*

[Text] United Nations, 17 October (TASS)—A globalization of disarmament processes, which should involve all the categories of arms and all countries and regions, is needed today, Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, has said. On Tuesday, he spoke during the general debate in the First Committee (political and security issues, including disarmament) of the 45th UN General Assembly session.

We are convinced that a philosophy of action geared toward specific deeds should become the philosophy of

multilateral disarmament now, he noted. The transformation of the attained conceptual concord on a broad range of problems of military and political security into practical deeds and legally formulated accords is required. The nature of mutual relations between states rules out a confrontation of forces and the concept of war as a continuation of policy today. And here logics prompts the following natural step—to agree on the parameters of a reasonable defense sufficiency of military potentials.

The path toward this, the speaker continued, lies in the unfolding of a broad international dialogue. Such a dialogue has already become a reality in relations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact member-countries. But it is not for nothing that the modern world is interrelated and mutually dependent. Its security may be reliably ensured only if the process of demilitarization spreads beyond the European continent and, also, if bilateral, regional, and multilateral efforts supplement one another.

Dwelling on the main directions of the world community's activity aimed at limiting and reducing arms and consolidating security, the USSR deputy foreign minister singled out such aspects as the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a ban on nuclear tests, a ban on and the elimination of chemical weapons, the limitation and reduction of deliveries and transfer of conventional arms, the limitation of the use of scientific and technical advances for military purposes, conversion of military resources, and predictability in military activity and its transparency.

The concept of a new internationalism based on consensus and collective actions, the primacy of international law, the complete engagement of the potential of all the mechanisms of multilateralism is being born in the world community's mind, the USSR deputy foreign minister stressed. The businesslike tenor of the current session and the orientation of our organization on fruitful work provide firm grounds for expecting that, in the near future, those of us in the First Committee will be able not only to strengthen a new model of international security but also form a preventive strategy for survival and consolidating peace. Realism, political courage, and preparedness for decisive actions are the main things that are needed from all states today, Vladimir Petrovskiy concluded.

Talks With U.S. on Chemical Weapons 'Important'

*LD1710083190 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT
17 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Kuznetsov]

[Text] New York, October 17 (TASS)—The 17th round of the Soviet-American talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which opened here Tuesday, will focus on

drafting a protocol on inspections to the Soviet-American agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons.

The agreement was signed by the Soviet and American presidents on June 1, 1990. In compliance with the provisions of the agreement, the drafting of the protocol is to be completed by December 31, 1990.

Experts will continue consultations on cooperation between the two countries in the technologies of chemical weapons destruction.

The sides will discuss progress in implementing the Soviet-American memorandum of understanding on a bilateral experiment in control and the exchange of information related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union and the United States will also discuss drafting a multilateral convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

Soviet delegation head Sergey Batsanov told TASS that the results of the forthcoming round of talks would be important to Soviet-American interaction and multilateral efforts to prohibit chemical weapons.

Unveiling of Military Data Called 'Breakthrough'

*PM1710154390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1*

[Article by correspondent V. Linnik: "Published for the First Time"]

[Excerpts] New York, 16 October—You would have thought that it would have to be a sensation—for the first time the Soviet Union has passed to the United Nations official and quite specific figures for the USSR's military spending during 1989. But I cannot say that there were claps of thunder and the skies opened on this day.

The journalists who gathered yesterday for the news conference given by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy received this news with due attention, but calmly. [passage omitted]

Our military spending last year totaled 77.9 billion rubles. The total, as in the United States, is greater than the military budget proper because it includes, in particular, spending on the production of nuclear warheads within the system of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation. [passage omitted]

There do seem to be certain obscure points in the information we have supplied to the United Nations. I cannot understand, in particular, why something has been crossed out in the section on expenditures on strategic forces. The accompanying elucidation states that this is connected with "the absence of a clearly expressed organization of strategic forces." The sum totals for spending on civil defense also give rise to questions. But these are details in comparison with the

tremendous breakthrough in the matter of openness which we have made, in my opinion, for the first time since the twenties.

U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney Visits Moscow

Meets With Shevardnadze

*LD1710155990 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT
17 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 17 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today met U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, it has been officially announced here.

The ministers highly assessed positive changes in Soviet-U.S. relations and the international climate as a whole in the recent years.

The changes allow the United States to revise its long-term strategy and military planning, Cheney said. He said the direction of the old U.S. strategy, when the building and deployment of the U.S. Army was carried out in accordance with preparations for a global conflict against the Soviet Union, will change.

He said a considerable reduction in U.S. military presence in Europe have already begun. The U.S. military budget is expected to be slashed by 180 million U.S. dollars in the five coming years, and the U.S. Armed Forces to be reduced by 20 to 25 percent, Cheney said.

The ministers discussed military strategical problems, which, they believe, deserve attention on the part of the Soviet and U.S. sides and other members of the international community.

They discussed the defence sufficiency concept, ways to establish a broad dialogue on the problems of strategic stability, regional security, the formation of security structures at the United Nations, the establishment of order in the international arms trade, problems of creation of new kinds of weapons and proliferation of most up-to-date weapons.

They discussed the Gulf crisis, noting that it is important that the Soviet Union and the United States proceed from common grounds at the UN Security Council.

Remarks to Shevardnadze Welcomed

*LD1710141190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 17 Oct 90*

[Report by diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin]

[Text] I'll try to be brief and laconic, but I think the report merits the most serious attention. I have been told by a senior official at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that during Shevardnadze's conversation with Cheney, a positive assessment was made of the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations, and here the U.S. secretary said that in light of the current development of these

relations, the United States is embarking upon a review of its strategic planning. In my view, it is worth paying special attention to Cheney's statement that the United States plans over the next five years to cut its military budget by \$180 billion and to reduce the size of its armed forces by 20-25 percent. When I heard these figures I recalled the assertions made by certain of our people's deputies about one-sided concessions by the USSR. Cheney, one can conclude from his words, is refuting these assertions with specific data. We are cutting our Armed Forces and so are the Americans.

An important problem was also raised in the conversation with the foreign minister. He spoke of ensuring regional security and raised the question of the need for control over the arms trade. In Shevardnadze's opinion, the USSR and the United States are themselves hardly in a position to deal with this problem, and it is necessary to put it before the entire international community.

Addresses Supreme Soviet

*LD1710175890 Moscow TASS in English 1736 GMT
17 Oct 90*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Excerpts] Moscow, October 17 (TASS)—U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, on a four-day official visit to the Soviet Union, today spoke to the Soviet parliament.

Cheney said that during talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov, they discussed the Gulf crisis, arms control, and changes in the Soviet and U.S. strategy in the light of the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations. [passage omitted]

In addition to answering questions, Cheney also asked Soviet deputies questions. He was particularly interested in the prospects for the establishment of a professional army in the USSR and for military conversion.

Soviet parliamentarian Leonid Sharin told Cheney that an experiment is currently underway in some Soviet navy and paratroopers units. They are being drafted on a contractual basis. The results of the experiment and the study of other armies' experience will then allow Soviet military planners to take a decision.

As for the conversion, considerable cuts in the manufacture of some military hardware are planned for this year, Sharin said. On the whole, after the realisation of the programme of military conversion between 1991-1995, arms production is expected to account for only 35 per cent of the total output of the military industrial complex, Sharin said.

PRAVDA Reports Gorbachev Meeting

*PM1810092890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1*

[TASS report: "Meeting Between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Cheney"]

[Text] The USSR president met with U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in the Kremlin on 17 October. The very fact of the meeting and the atmosphere, like the visit, which forms part of the now traditional exchange between the two states' top military leaders, is striking evidence of the level of Soviet-American mutual understanding, cooperation, and trust.

Cheney conveyed President Bush's sincere congratulations on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to M.S. Gorbachev. In response M.S. Gorbachev said that he would not wish to personalize such recognition by the international community. It is an appreciation of the great transformations in the Soviet Union and of our cause which we have undertaken together and which has already been marked by fundamental changes in the world situation. They are mainly due to the improvement in U.S.-USSR relations. Great heights have been scaled here, and this enables us to look far ahead. The new line in world politics already has its own history. It has withstood very serious trials, including the testing events in the Persian Gulf.

Dwelling on this, M.S. Gorbachev asked that the U.S. President be informed of his immutable commitment to the Helsinki accords. The Soviet leadership will firmly uphold the line expressed in the UN Security Council resolutions, using every opportunity to find a political solution. He also noted that the most recent bloody events were another reminder of the need to settle the conflict in the Near East as a whole.

M.S. Gorbachev expressed satisfaction that ways toward concluding a treaty on the results of the Vienna talks and an agreement on halving strategic offensive armaments have been found. The unprecedented openness in contacts in the military sphere and understanding of the existing realities in the two states' military activity suggest that it will be possible after the conclusion of agreements on conventional arms in Europe and on strategic offensive arms to tackle immediately such problems as deep cuts in military budgets and naval armaments, the production of nuclear weapons, stopping nuclear tests, and conversion.

The realization that war between the the USSR and the United States is impossible and must never occur, M.S. Gorbachev noted, has long since shifted from the sphere of philosophical speculation to the sphere of practical action. In order to move to a universal order of peace in this rapidly changing world it is very important that good relations between two such powers continue to be asserted.

We value, M.S. Gorbachev noted, the understanding shown by George Bush and many other Americans of the crucial period through which the Soviet Union is now going. We judge this not just by statements but by the mode of action. In view of the relations prevailing between the two presidents, M.S. Gorbachev briefed Cheney, for George Bush's benefit, on upcoming decisions to stabilize the situation in the country and strengthen authority at all levels in order to maintain the fundamental course of perestroika, ensure the country's democratic development, and do everything possible for its economic revival in the conditions of the new state formation—a union of sovereign states. One of history's particular features, he noted, is that everything circumstantial and incidental is forgotten, while the main thing remains. We are optimists; we believe we will succeed.

On the U.S. President's behalf Richard Cheney expressed interest in the Soviet Union being a stable, prosperous, and democratic state.

Taking part were D.T. Yazov, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.M. Shabanov, and A.F. Dobrynin; P. Wolfowitz, J. Matlock, P. Williams, L. Libby, A. Canter, and D. Lopez.

Meets With Soviet Legislators

*PM1810231590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by correspondent A. Sychev: "We Too Are Changing." U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees"]

[Excerpts] U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Defense Ministry. His schedule includes visits to troop units and military facilities and meetings at all levels. R. Cheney has already held conversations with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and the foreign and defense ministers. He also attended a meeting at the USSR Supreme Soviet where he was received by members of the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and the International Affairs Committee.

Questions were asked by both sides and they touched on the development of events in the Persian Gulf, measures to control the arms race, our states' revision of their strategic doctrines, and the progress made over the last two years in bilateral relations and also in the talks on conventional armed forces and strategic arms. [passage omitted]

Describing the formulation of the new, so-called offensive-defensive doctrine in the United States, R. Cheney pointed out that the United States intends to cut its Armed Forces by approximately 35 percent over the next five years. There will be 12-14 instead of 17 active divisions; the naval forces will keep 450 warships; and contingents in Western Europe will be cut back. R. Cheney recalled that the U.S. Congress is considering next year's budget, which envisages cuts in the Armed

Forces of 100,000 men. "I am in favor of cutting back U.S. Armed Forces personnel, but not as rapidly as the Congress is trying to do," R. Cheney said.

In this connection he voiced concern at the pace of military production in the USSR and the scale of arms modernization. According to American data, the Soviet Armed Forces are today developing at least four or five new nuclear missiles, including those to replace the missile arsenal aboard the Typhoon-class submarine. What is more, last year the USSR produced 140 ballistic missiles, while the United States only produced 12. We have built two nuclear-powered submarines, they have built one, while the figures for tanks are 1,800 and 600 respectively. "That is why we display restraint on questions of qualitative arms race control," he stressed. "Can we expect a significant reduction in USSR military production in view of the shortage of funds for other sectors of the economy?"

In response to this question, he received exhaustive information about the military conversion program under way in our country as a result of which 60 percent of capacities are to be converted to the production of nonmilitary output.

R. Cheney asked deputies about the measures that the USSR is taking to ensure the inviolability of the country's nuclear arsenal in areas of heightened sociopolitical and ethnic tension. L. Sharin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, replied that the government has not made a decision to move these weapons to other regions, if you do not count some changes of position unconnected with the disturbances.

"It is very important for us to be sure that the changes in the USSR are irreversible. For the military there exist potentials and intentions. The components of potential are armed forces, weapons systems, and the way in which they are deployed, while the Soviet Government's aspirations represent the intention. We are quite clear on the latter that the Soviet side's intentions toward the United States are far less menacing today than previously. The potential is also changing, yet you still have the largest armed forces. But we are reacting to the changes and are ourselves changing," U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney said.

Thus, during this visit R. Cheney is seeking "balance between risk and the developing potential," as he writes in his book which has recently been republished in the United States. After so many decades of confrontation and mistrust, this is not easy for either the Americans or for us.

Advocates Arms Cuts, Reform

*PM1910092490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Oct 90 First Edition p 3*

[Report by Colonel V. Markushin: "R. Cheney's Stay in Moscow"]

[Excerpt] A meeting took place in the Kremlin on 17 October between U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney and

members of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees for international affairs and defense and state security questions. The Pentagon leader preferred not to deliver some report specially prepared for the occasion, but to engage in a real dialogue with Soviet legislators. It must be admitted that the dialogue proved interesting. In any event, I felt that it did much to help "clear the air" on a number of very important problems.

One such problem is, of course, arms control. Naturally, our deputies were interested in the position of the White House administration representative on this point above all. What does R. Cheney think about the prospects for disarmament? How, in his view, can the process of qualitative modernization of arms be halted?

Answering basically these questions, the leader of the American military department stressed, in particular, that in principle he advocates reducing troops and arms, since favorable preconditions for this have been created: the general improvement in Soviet-American relations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central and Eastern Europe, the resolution of the question of German unification. From Cheney's viewpoint, the general process of demilitarization will depend to a considerable extent on how successful the changes in the Soviet Union prove to be, and on how real the fall in the level of military production in the USSR turns out to be in the immediate future. We have recently become convinced of your country's good intentions, the secretary said, but it is not only a question of intentions, but also of potential. The Soviet Union's military potential worries us, it is growing, despite the acute economic problems within the country.

Arms modernization is, as Cheney put it, a special question. The American side, he said, acts in accordance with the efforts made by the USSR in this direction. In particular, he referred to the work which, according to his information, is in progress in the Soviet Union to create new ballistic missiles. Modernization also affects nuclear ammunition and tests of such ammunition. The American defense secretary expressed the conviction that tests as such represent no danger. In his opinion it is important to make nuclear weapons safe during storage and experiments, and to prevent radioactive discharges into the atmosphere, because that leads to tragedies like Chernobyl. [passage omitted]

Cheney Gives Impressions

*LD1910220290 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT
19 Oct 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, October 19 (TASS)—Meetings of heads of the Soviet Union and the United States military agencies are no longer viewed as a sensation. Over two years ago, the then U.S. Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci visited Moscow. Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy

Yasov was the Pentagon's guest in 1989. Chiefs of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces visited the United States twice. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a reply visit to the Soviet Union. And still meetings of heads of the two countries' defences continue to attract attention of journalists and political scientists.

It will not be an overstatement that a joint news conference of Richard Cheney and Dmitriy Yazov was indicative of the present state of Soviet-American relations in the military area. The U.S. defence secretary concluded his visit to Moscow today. Journalists who attended the news conference paid attention not only to the content of the statements of the defence ministers of the two superpowers but also to the way they spoke.

The ministers of the two countries expressed satisfaction with the results of the talks, noted positive changes in the world which led to the decrease of military confrontation and emphasised their adherence to the strengthening of peace and stability. They spoke in a calm and benevolent tone and their statements were punctuated with humour.

At the same time, Cheney, at a meeting with Soviet legislators expressed concern over Soviet missile tests, while noting that the United States is not going to give up its competitive strategy which envisages the switching of the arms race to the realm of high technologies with the creation of star wars systems, Stealth bombers, etc.

Yazov said at the news conference it is not on South Korea that U.S. strategic missiles are targeted, and that Soviet missiles are not trained on Venezuela. In order to eliminate mutual distrust it is necessary to liquidate nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union suggests.

Still it should be noted that within the year since the previous meeting of the defence ministers of the two countries, the military of both countries exerted fresh efforts towards greater mutual understanding.

Asked about his impressions from the Soviet Union, Cheney said that he had started out as a sceptic, but the events of the past 18 months convinced him that a new era of Soviet-American relations sets in.

Yazov Views Cheney Visit

*PM2010234990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 20 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1*

[Interview with USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by N. Belan; place and date not given: "This Process Is Irreversible"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] An interview with U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney was published in the last issue of our newspaper. Today, at the close of Mr. Cheney's visit to the USSR, USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov continues the conversation begun then specially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[Belan] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, what is your opinion of the results of the visit and your talks with Mr. Cheney?

[Yazov] They proved extremely fruitful, a good new base has been laid for constructive work in the future. As you know, Mr. Cheney met USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee. We held several meetings with him during which we discussed problems linked with our ministries' mutual activity and confirmed those ideas set out in the protocol signed by the chiefs of the General Staffs of the U.S. and USSR Armed Forces during Army General M. Moiseyev's recent trip to America. We also examined a number of issues connected with military activity and discussed the state of affairs in the Near East. Mr. Cheney visited a Moscow District Air Defense command post, an Airborne Assault Forces training center, and an aviation plant.

I think that any prejudices our guest may have had before his visit have now been dispelled. First, we told him that we agree to a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms; second, we did not conceal anything special, "supersecret," when showing off our troops, and we were sincere and interested in further establishing and strengthening mutual trust. I am sure that Mr. Cheney realized and appreciated this. This was not our first meeting, and I want to stress that Mr. Cheney is a prominent statesman and politician.

Both before and during his visit many of the mass media predicted that Mr. Cheney would certainly press Yazov to reveal some secrets of the weapons that we have sold to Iraq—how much of this weaponry is there, what its specifications and performance characteristics are, and so on. I must say that Mr. Cheney did not ask these questions. The press has also talked a great deal about existing problems—for instance, with regard to the conclusion of the treaties on strategic offensive and conventional arms they said, moreover, that we would meet with Cheney and resolve them in a flash. I can disabuse you on this: The negotiating process is not simple, it cannot be depicted in such a simplified manner.

[Belan] Of late we have witnessed a unique process—the building of mutual trust between the USSR and U.S. Armed Forces. I have already asked Mr. Cheney the question and I would now like to know your opinion: On what does this process depend and what may hinder it?

[Yazov] Let us recall how it started and how it has intensified. When we announced our defensive doctrine and then a unilateral cut of 500,000 men in our Armed Forces, our tanks, and combat aircraft, this generated definite trust in us on the part of the United States. This trust was deepened when the negotiating process went further and the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was concluded. Our words were not at variance with our actions and, moreover, the accords have been fulfilled to the letter. Life has shown that both sides have proved eminently honest partners.

This has been followed by exchanges of military delegations. I believe that if this continues we will very soon be able to reduce confrontation to a level where war becomes altogether impossible.

[Belan] But there are also other countries in addition to the United States and the USSR....

[Yazov] True. However, the change in USSR-U.S. relations is having a substantial impact on the international climate. For instance, Britain and France have already announced the withdrawal of some of their troops from Germany. The FRG has also decided to cut back the Bundeswehr. Although no one demanded that they do this, they themselves have joined in the process of detente. Talks are now under way with China, and China is ready to agree with us to a reciprocal reduction of some number of troops. The process of establishing contacts with Japan is under way and a definite accord may be secured with it, too.

So, mutual trust depends on a good attitude toward one another and practical steps from our countries along the path of disarmament, along with perseverance and sincerity. Mutual suspicion, misunderstanding of the aims and tasks of one another's defense, and refusal to agree to compromise and fresh contacts may hamper this process.

[Belan] What are your predictions with regard to the development of events in the Persian Gulf?

[Yazov] It is hard to predict the situation there at the moment. I personally am in favor of resolving the problem by political means, and we do not disagree with Mr. Cheney on this. We do not want war or bloodshed there. I would like to believe that reason and common sense will gain the upper hand and that the UN resolution will be fulfilled.

[Belan] On taking your leave of Mr. Cheney you must certainly have agreed on fresh contacts and on deepening ties?

[Yazov] Yes, the U.S. defense secretary invited me to visit America again. In addition the limits of our mutual activity are expanding, including exchanges of delegations at the most diverse levels. I also hope that soldiers will meet soon, too. All this serves to strengthen our trust and mutual understanding. This process between our peoples and states is irreversible.

TASS Analyst Questions SDI 'New Rationale'

*LD1710211290 Moscow TASS in English 1805 GMT
17 Oct 90*

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, October 17 (TASS)—Henry Cooper, chief of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative Organisation, has announced a rethink of SDI goals and, consequently, of its structure and programme. Cooper stressed that the goals must be more moderate and call for

creating a defence against limited nuclear strikes rather than against a massive attack involving several thousand ballistic missiles.

This is not the first time the programme has had to be redrafted. The Pentagon has long ago disowned the goals, proclaimed in 1983 by the then President, Ronald Reagan, namely to create an "impenetrable shield" over America. The plan was replaced by a more modest scheme which envisaged deployment of the so-called Brilliant Pebbles system.

However, this system as well should have consisted of hundreds of combat platforms, armed with small anti-missile missiles, intended for deployment in space. There is every indication to believe that at the first stage the Pentagon plans to forego space for ground-based antimissile missiles.

Why such "metamorphoses" in the American programme? First, recent events, such as radical changes in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty on the whole, the demise of the "enemy image", the feasibility of achieving a Soviet-U.S. agreement on deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons already this year, effectively eliminate any grounds for the creation of the strategic defence system.

Second, getting Congress allocations for the SDI has become extremely complicated. This is explained by the unfavourable financial situation in the United States and positive changes in East-West relations.

Finally, the real state of affairs in the field of SDI-related technology also makes itself felt to some degree. There has been no success in developing not only "exotic" but even "classical" weapons, also intended for deployment in space.

Incidentally, even faced by reality SDI proponents do not want to give up their "star faith". As the main reason which allegedly makes the continuation of work on the SDI programme necessary, they name now, instead of the Soviet nuclear missile stockpile, the deployment of ballistic missiles in developing countries, including those which Americans brand as adhering to international terrorism.

A question arises: is the new rationale for the SDI rational? Should one create even a "thin" system of anti-missile defence against nuclear terrorists when terrorists can deliver a nuclear charge to U.S. territory by conventional means? Any country which launches a nuclear-tipped missile can rightfully expect a mighty strike in reply from the Americans.

At the same time, another thing is important: any solution proposed now will become only the first phase in the creation of the SDI. Once it is started, the first phase will be followed by a second, a third, etc. It is difficult now to rule out an option when in future SDI proponents will demand implementing the "Star Wars"

concept in full and putting in space armaments systems, which can hardly be imagined even in general outline now.

It seems that there is only one wonder weapon which can protect America against nuclear attack: an agreement on arms control, including treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and rocket technology, so desperately needed today.

It is in this direction that efforts and funds should be spent.

Proposal Issued on Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea

*LD1810212190 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT
18 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 18 (TASS)—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy today met the ambassadors of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Germany.

The attention of the ambassadors was drawn to President Gorbachev's statement of October 26, 1989 in the Finlandia Palace. The statement said the Soviet Union had made a decision concerning its nuclear forces in the Baltic Sea and had begun the unilateral elimination of some types of sea-based nuclear arms in the region.

The Soviet Union pledged to scrap all the nuclear ballistic missile-carrying submarines, dubbed "Golf" in the West, that were deployed in the region.

On October 15, 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the Soviet parliament that the Soviet Union had kept its promise.

Now the Soviet Union is making a new major peace initiative aimed at further strengthening stability in Europe. The ambassadors invited to the conversation were handed a note by the USSR Foreign Ministry which said:

"The Soviet Union gives up the deployment in peace time of nuclear arms on Soviet ships and combat aircraft on the Baltic Sea and in the airspace above the Baltic on a permanent or a temporary basis.

"This step by the Soviet Union creates practical prerequisites of a military, material and political nature for granting nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea.

"As a practical step in this direction, we propose that nuclear-weapon and Baltic countries pledge not to deploy nuclear weapons on the sea floor and inside the sea bedrock within the boundaries of territorial and inland waters and ban, without exception, all calls into the Baltic Sea of nuclear weapon-carrying ships and submarines and flights of nuclear arms-carrying aircraft above the Baltic Sea.

"For the purpose of considering questions related to the working out of effective guarantees of the Baltic Sea's

nuclear-free status, the Soviet Union is prepared to start respective negotiations with nuclear powers and Baltic states.

"These negotiations should lead to an agreement on verification of the implementation of the accords concerning the Baltic Sea's non-nuclear status.

"We believe that the granting of the nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea should be accompanied by carrying out other measures to strengthen strategic stability in the Baltic Sea, including greater openness and predictability of the naval activity.

"The Soviet Union proposes holding needed consultations by experts to prepare the negotiations."

During the conversation, it was stressed that the Soviet Union's new unilateral step was made possible as a result of deep changes taking place on our continent and in the entire range of East-West relations and the development process of actual disarmament. The Soviet Union hopes that its new initiative will meet with an adequate reaction on the part of our partners, the deputy foreign minister said.

INF U.S.-Soviet Special Verification Commission Meets

*LD1810202990 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT
18 Oct 90*

[Text] Geneva, October 18 (TASS)—A regular ninth session of the Special Control Commission [Special Verification Commission] opened here today. The Commission was set up in accordance with the Soviet-American treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles [INF Treaty]. The session will discuss issues dealing with the implementation of the treaty.

Arkhangelsk Declares Itself Nuclear-Free Zone

*LD2210115790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1131 GMT 22 Oct 90*

[Report by TASS correspondent Vladimir Anufriyev]

[Text] Arkhangelsk, 22 October (TASS)—The White Sea port city of Arkhangelsk has been declared a nuclear-free zone within the city limits by a decision of the city soviet, an elected local government body.

All enterprises, organizations, and citizens—both of the USSR and of foreign states—are henceforth prohibited from manufacturing, importing, transporting, or siting within the city any items or materials in which radioactive elements are used without the consent of the city soviet of people's deputies. All existing sources of radioactive radiation must be registered before the end of the year with the city's environmental protection commission, which has been given supervisory functions and the right to take harsh measures, up to and including the closure of enterprises infringing Arkhangelsk's nuclear-free status.

FRANCE

Mitterrand Asks for 'Concrete' Nuclear Proposals

AU1910162390 Paris AFP in English 1605 GMT
19 Oct 90

[Text] Paris, October 19 (AFP) — French President Francois Mitterrand Friday [19 October] instructed his defence minister to come up with "concrete proposals" in the next two months on the future of French nuclear deterrence, an official statement said Friday. Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement was asked to prepare his proposals by the end of the year "in order to safeguard the future of French nuclear defence and maintain its credibility, with the next century in sight," the statement said.

A decision from Mr. Mitterrand on the future of France's independent nuclear strike force had been expected since Monday, when he told a news conference that he would make a statement before the end of the week.

France is currently faced with the choice of whether to go ahead with the planned modernisation of France's land-based strategic nuclear missiles, or to phase them out in order to develop an air-to-surface weapon which would be carried by the new Rafale fighter.

Britain is to decide in the next few weeks whether to contribute to the air-to-ground missile known as the ASLP (air-sol longue portee) which would have a range of 1,500 kilometres (937 miles).

The military hierarchy is reported to be split on the options.

A decision to phase out the 18 ground-to-ground missiles at the southern Albion plateau base would be a major shift in France's cherished nuclear strike force, as it would involve the elimination of an entire branch of France's nuclear defence which enjoys widespread public support.

The strike force has three components: the surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200 miles), medium-range weapons carried by 18 Mirage-4 aircraft, and strategic and short-range missiles on board France's five nuclear submarines. Mr. Chevenement on Wednesday said however it was "too early" to talk of eliminating the Albion plateau.

Parliament is to debate France's nuclear forces when deputies consider updating the military programme for four years from 1992. The nuclear programme in 1991 is to cost some 33 billion francs (6.5 billion dollars). Military experts say that the need to overhaul the nuclear force is dictated both by strategic and budgetary motives at a time when disarmament in Europe is gaining pace.

GERMANY

Status, Prospects of CFE Talks Reviewed

90WC0112A Bonn AUS POLITIK UND
ZEITGESCHICHTE in German 31 Aug 90 pp 3-12

[Analysis by Heinz Magenheimer, editor of OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT: "Conventional Stability and Security in Europe—Troop Reductions, Reequipment, and the Viennese CSCE Conference"]

[Text] *Measures of a security-political and military nature that are currently under way in Europe are basically aimed at increasing conventional stability, which, however, cannot be satisfied, under any circumstances, with only the establishment of equal upper limits in military forces in Europe as a whole or in specific zones.*

The de facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the internal difficulties of the Soviet armed forces, as well as the Soviet troop withdrawals from eastern Central Europe, make the search for a new network in security-political East-West relations imperative.

The continuously increasing orientation of the states of eastern Central Europe toward Western Europe and the EC leads to new political and economic challenges; it will cause the traditional East-West confrontation, in the military sense, to take a back seat. With the turning away from the mutual threat situation that has prevailed to date, new dangers and challenges from completely different parts of the world move to center stage.

I. Introduction

Particularly during the first three rounds, the "Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" (CFE), which began in Vienna on 9 March 1989, registered significant successes, successes which one would hardly have considered possible in view of the fruitlessness of the MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction] talks concluded on 2 February 1989 on mutual and balanced troop reductions. As a result of the events which have been taking place at a breathtaking pace since the late summer of 1989 in the GDR, in eastern Central Europe, and even in the Soviet Union itself, the observer is confronted, on the one hand, with the requirement of conducting a security-political inventory which reflects the situation at a specific point in time, and, on the other, by the desire to offer an estimate of developments over the short and medium term.

Since certain variables—as, for example, the transformation process in the Soviet Union and the future of the regime itself—can be estimated only within very broad limits, it would appear to make more sense to give preferential treatment to the reasonably stable dimensions in the depiction of the situation. These include the force potentials in existence or in the process of being withdrawn, the interim results of the CSCE, the basic

objectives of the two pact groups, and the trends perceived to date in the political orientation of the states of eastern Central Europe.

II. The Search for Conventional Stability in Europe

The concept of "conventional stability," originally used only by the Western side, is part of a much broader concept of political-strategic stability, in which a system is the more stable when it can combine a maximum of capability for peace with a maximum of adaptability. The degree of stability of a political system is therefore measured primarily by the change that it can endure without entering into a military conflict.¹

Accordingly, political-strategic stability is interpreted primarily from a security-political viewpoint and it is identical to a large extent with the concept of "strategic stability," which encompasses the entire planning and command complex with respect to achieving a political objective. It should on no account be confused with nuclear-strategic stability. "Strategic stability" is based on the claim of taking into consideration all security-related factors at work between the various states and also within the states,² whereby the aspect of external security is given precedence, however.

A further important concept is the "military stability," which in practical terms means the effect relationship at the strategic level and which evidences itself when, in the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there is a certain amount of uncertainty over the prospects for success of a major attack by the Eastern side.³ Based on this definition, both in the eyes of the responsible NATO planners as well as from the viewpoint of the Soviet general staff, a certain relationship of potentials, but also of reciprocal military options, must exist so as not to let the degree of uncertainty linked to an attack drop below a critical level.

In recent years, many reflections have been circulating on the size, the structure, and the quality of the military potential which the weaker side would need in order to preserve the "adequacy of defense," or military "sufficiency" pure and simple. The arguments that have been taking place for many years on the meaning and purpose of alternative defense concepts were basically concerned with the question of how a military potential could be established which possesses a maximum of defensive strength and, *at the same time*, a maximum of stability in the political-strategic sense—also from the perspective of the potential adversary—which engenders confidence, in other words.⁴

The central concern of "conventional stability," therefore, now as in the past, is the reorganization and reequipment into conventional force potentials which "with respect to organization, structure, armament, and strategy are patently incapable of an act of military aggression."⁵ In addition, it was very soon demanded that this was to involve not only the restructuring and reequipment of the armed forces at their various levels, but also a reformulation of the military, or operational,

doctrine, a reformulation which should agree with the potentials established in keeping with its objectives.

It has frequently been stated, justifiably, to some extent, that it is not sufficient just to establish an approximate numerical "balance of forces" or perhaps even an arithmetic parity, but rather to create a "balance of military options," so as to reduce to a minimum the subjectively perceived attack prospects of the other side.⁶ Not without good reason, the cogent historical argument could be heard again and again of states or alliances whose forces were approximately equal to or numerically inferior to those of the adversary and which nevertheless emerged victorious. This alone demonstrates that "balance" and "numerical parity" represent a condition that has been subordinated to the striving for stability.⁷

In addition, reference should be made to the concept of "crisis stability," where "crisis stability" in essence exists in those cases where none of the parties to the conflict perceives an opportunity, in the course of a developing crisis, of gaining a significant advantage by means of a military operation. This relates above all to the preemptive advantage of a surprise attack, which applies equally to both nuclear and conventional preemption. This can include extensive air operations on the part of the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe for the purpose of running under the "nuclear threshold" just as it can include attacks early in a conflict with weapons systems capable of surprise employment, with missiles, for example, against the enemy's hinterland. On the other hand, whether or not the controversial installation of Pershing II missiles from late-1983 on ran counter to crisis stability⁸ is a question which, in view of the enormous escalation risks and imponderables associated with an assumed preemptive strike against these missile targets, must be left open.

The numerous controversies over the advantages and disadvantages of the various defense concepts, despite all differences, have left the impression that a clearly defensive orientation, which affects not only the strategic and operational but also the tactical level, is unattainable. Such an orientation would be thinkable only if there were a renunciation of every single counterstrike and counterattack element. Since no conclusive judgment can be given on the offensive or defensive character of military potentials, other criteria must be considered. These include, for example, the consideration of the mutual threat assessments and of the political-strategic framework, as well as the renunciation of an "invasion capability," i.e., the capacity to conquer and, for a time, also to hold enemy territory on a strategic scale.⁹ And finally, much will depend on whether it will be possible for the "efficiency hypothesis of defense," which has shown itself to be sound at the battalion and regiment level, to be reviewed in a positive light also on the larger strategic scale.

But even under the aspects discussed above, the defender can still have a potential at his disposal which in the eyes

of the potential adversary keeps highly threatening conventional and nuclear options in readiness. It was therefore proposed that, with respect to size, structure and equipment, the armed forces be formed in such a way that they would no longer be capable of causing existential damage to the territory of the adversary.¹⁰ Thinking this through, one arrives at the conclusion that this would include primarily the renunciation of nuclear options, including a nuclear first strike, as well as the renunciation of preemptive actions of all types—an idea which lately has no longer been completely officially rejected by NATO. Developments currently perceptible in the Bundeswehr also justify the conclusion that, because of the military weakening and restructuring in the eastern alliance, an upward revaluation of strategic command can be expected, despite NATO's basic posture of being committed to strategic defense.¹¹

A military, or operational, doctrine completely committed to a defensive role should therefore be based on the following principles:

1. Territorial self-restraint ("Self-Restraint Principle"): All military planning and strategic objectives must be limited to actions for the protection of one's own national territory; all military actions (including air operations) can only serve the establishment of the *status quo ante*;
2. Renunciation of the first use of armed force ("Response Principle"): Limiting combat actions to military response;
3. Renunciation of the infliction of existential damage to the adversary ("Principle of Minimization of Damage"): Every measure which can lead to an escalation of range and weapons effectiveness is to be subordinated to purely military requirements;
4. The orientation of the entire military establishment, in military- strategic, tactical-strategic and tactical respects, to the defense ("Guideline Principle").

In connection with the last of these principles, a case in point, for example, would be the spatial "division" of major formations by separation of the combat troops, on the one hand, and of the combat support troops and logistics, on the other, where it is the logistical capacity, particularly, which represents an important feature for the characterization of a defensive or offensive orientation of the military doctrine.¹²

III. Transformation of the Warsaw Pact: Troop Reductions, Withdrawals, Reorganizations

The de facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a result of the political upheavals since the late autumn of 1989 has apparently pushed the question of creating a structural non-offensive capability into the background, even though it has not basically lost its significance. The announcements of the Soviet general secretary on 7 December 1988 concerning the unilateral reduction of Soviet troops in the four Western Forward Area states, as

well as the actual withdrawals that began in March 1989, already created—together with the fundamental objectives of the CFE—an expectancy posture which at first was focused the establishment of a numerical parity in the most significant military quantities. The objectives already spelled out in the mandate for the CFE of 10 January 1989 spoke of the "creation of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces" (including conventional armament and equipment) at a lower level, as well as of the "elimination of imbalances." In this way, both pact groups were to be deprived of the "capability of initiating surprise attacks and of launching major offensive operations." Measures deemed suitable for this purpose were, among others, the reduction, limitation, and redeployment (regrouping, redistribution) of troops.¹³

In that way it became evident that both alliances were content to settle for the elimination of an "invasion capability," i.e., the capability to attack on a strategic scale, the elimination of strategic surprise, and the creation of equal upper limits for personnel and main weapons systems in certain geographic zones. The successes registered during the negotiations, particularly during the first three sessions, made the signing of a treaty still in the autumn of 1990 appear achievable.

The troop withdrawal agreements between Moscow and Prague (26 February 1990) and between Moscow and Budapest (10 March 1990) did, to be sure, lend added dynamics to the security-political situation: If one takes into account that the Soviet forces in the CSFR and Hungary, which at the end of May 1990 still numbered 48,000 and 44,000 men, respectively, will, in keeping with these agreements, no longer be in these countries as of mid-1991, the problem of eliminating an "invasion capability" has no doubt been taken care of once and for all, though surely not in the form or sequence desired by Moscow. At that time, if no unforeseen dramatic events occur, the Soviet command will have only the "Group of Forces, West" available to it in its Forward Area, which because of the loss of significance and/or dismantlement of the NVA [National People's Army] and the almost inconsequential "Group of Forces, North" in Poland will constitute the only Soviet group of forces in eastern Central Europe which in a strategic sense has at least a limited attack capability. The option still being considered in the mid-1980's, namely that of a major offensive against Western Europe, carried out by forces limited to Soviet forces stationed in the Forward Area countries,¹⁴ thus loses even more credibility.

The attribute of a limited offensive capability rests not least on the numerous problems existing within the ground and air forces of the "Soviet Forces, West" (including a lowering of morale, numerous offenses, excesses by superiors, a lower threat awareness¹⁵): Can a Group of Forces such as this, numerically strong, to be sure, but without reliable allies to fall back on, without interaction with the "Group of Forces, Center" be adjudged to have the same attack effectiveness as an intact force available to the Warsaw Pact as recently as

the mid-1980's? Does not the clinging to the number of troops currently stationed by the "Soviet Forces, West" in the GDR (circa 363,000 men) serve the purpose, primarily, of not giving up the last military "bargaining chip" with respect to the CFE treaty and the unification of Germany?

A look at the numerical size of the Soviet troops stationed abroad at the end of May 1990 yields the following picture:¹⁶

Soviet Forces West (GDR)	circa 363,000 men
Soviet Forces North (Poland)	circa 54,000 men
Soviet Forces Center (CSFR)	circa 48,000 men
Soviet Forces South (Hungary)	circa 44,000 men
Total	509,000 men

A comparison of this situation with the armed forces potential *before* the commencement of reductions (a total of circa 583,000 men) yields a decrease of all of 13 percent; if one figures in the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the CSFR by the middle of 1991 and the pullback announced for 1990 of circa 5,000 men of the "Soviet Forces, North" (and assuming that there will be no change in the "Soviet Forces, West"), a total of only 412,000 men will presumably be left in eastern Central Europe from mid-1991 on; the reduction would then be almost 30 percent.

All things considered, these reductions take on even greater significance if one looks at the sometimes drastic reductions and reorganizations of the armed forces in the GDR, in Poland, in the CSFR, and in Hungary, some of which have already been implemented and the rest announced for 1990/91. Only then does a finished picture emerge of the loss of military potential by the Warsaw Pact. Among the changes under way are the reduction of the Polish armed forces to circa 300,000 men (compared to circa 390,000 men in 1987) and the reorganization into what will then only be six "mechanized divisions" of readiness category I, the reduction of armed forces of the CSFR to a presumed total of 170,000 to 180,000 men by the end of 1990,¹⁷ having a core of only five divisions (including only one tank division) of readiness category I, and the continuing reduction of the Hungarian armed forces to a level of circa 75,000 men and only 15 combat brigades; a further reduction is being sought in Hungary to circa 60,000 men, 750 battle tanks, 900 artillery pieces, and 90 combat aircraft.¹⁸

Added to this are the curtailments of compulsory military service to 18 months in Poland (presumably from the fall of 1990 on), to 18 months in the CSFR (already in effect), and to 12 months in Hungary (planned from 1990/91 on). For economic reasons, a steady pressure is being applied on the armed forces command in all these countries to make major cuts in the military budget, while measures for armament conversion are to bring medium and long-term relief to the civilian sectors. In

Poland, for example, savings of 16 percent were announced in defense expenditures for the year 1989 as compared to 1988.¹⁹

With respect to the armed forces in the GDR, it should be noted, in view of the current changes there, that unofficial estimates gave an identical strength figure of circa 90,000 to 100,000 men in February/March 1990, whereas in late May the official strength figure was given as approximately 135,000 men. On 29 June in Vienna, the state secretary for disarmament placed the assigned strength of military personnel at 95,000 men. The reduction in military expenditures is to amount to 30 percent. From May 1990 on, the compulsory military service is to be curtailed to only 12 months.

IV. Will the Reorganizations in the Soviet Armed Forces Lead to a New Threat?

Various reports are available on the changes taking place in the organization of the Soviet and eastern Central European armed forces which have frequently been cited as proof for the transition to a defensive orientation in the tactical sector. The withdrawal and/or deactivation of one tank regiment in each Soviet tank and motorized rifle division in the Forward Area states has, to be sure, reduced the number of battle tanks by 18.4 percent and 39.8 percent, depending on the type of division involved;²⁰ it does not constitute a criterion for a non-offensive capability, however. Similarly, the transition to the "norm" division having four motorized rifle regiments with 40 battle tanks each (according to statements made by Marshal Viktor Kulikov in Vienna on 29 May), and without offense-capable engineer equipment and attack helicopters, can only be assumed to indicate a reduction in striking power. On the other hand, the possibility that a Soviet Army equipped primarily with armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery might develop a greater attack capability in Central Europe than in the past seems exaggerated.²¹

A less threatening weapon than the battle tank which was viewed as the primary threat in the past thus becomes the focus of our attention, in response to which it could be argued that it will be easier for NATO to take defensive measures against it than against the tank threat, and that it will depend above all on the organization and equipment of these major formations, whether they can be credited with having a greater offensive capability against Western Europe than in the past.

Above all, however, there are numerous indications that the Soviet economy is in the greatest crisis of its history, which of necessity must also have a negative effect on the armament industry as well and thus also on the future equipment of the armed forces. One can assume that the burden placed on the Soviet economy by military expenditures in the broadest sense has over the years grown so enormously that only drastic cutbacks in the military and armament sectors, as well as a radical restructuring of resources, will have a chance of succeeding.

Without going into the numerous treatises written on the negative effects of Soviet military expenditures,²² let me limit myself to citing certain size relationships: It is assumed that the Soviet gross national product [GNP] is at this point—monetary conversion difficulties notwithstanding—only approximately one-third of that of the United States; if one assumes the defense expenditures of the USSR in the year 1989 to have been circa 280 to 320 billion U.S. dollars (including the numerous “hidden” resources), this would equate to circa 15 percent of the current GNP—a figure which, all in all, is also considered reliable by the CIA.²³ The corresponding quotas for the United States and the FRG are circa 5.5 percent and 2.5 percent of the GNP. The total of Soviet military expenditures for 1989 (77.3 billion rubles), which for the first time was submitted in broken down form, is, to be sure, significantly higher than the releases customary in the past, but can be viewed only as representing the value of military expenditures in the “narrower sense,” which can be properly reviewed only when all ministries have revealed their defense-related budgetary appropriations. In June 1990, the Soviet president even spoke of military expenditures amounting to up to 18 percent of the national income.

The numerous other problems that beset the Soviet economy, among them the rapid decline in productivity, the increasing budget deficit, the low in the growth rate in which the economy has been mired since approximately the mid-1970's, the declining work ethic, above all the catastrophic supply situation,²⁴ and, last but not least, the national erosion symptoms, practically rule out a modernization drive in the armed forces, even if their numbers were to be sharply reduced. On the contrary, for the short and medium term, the numerous social and psychopolitical phenomena caused by the reduction of the armed forces—more than 160,000 families of officers and NCO's of units slated for deactivation are looking for a place to live, for example²⁵—justify the assumption that there will be a further decrease in the significance of the armed forces and a worsening of the identity crisis.

Not without good reason has a violent controversy been taking place since the end of 1988 on the introduction of a professional army; not without good reason has a bill providing for the introduction of a military recruiting and replacement service been discussed since May 1990, so as to cushion the imminent decline of the armed forces by means of centrifugal, nationalistic tendencies. The announcement that a smaller but highly modern army having greater combat effectiveness is to be created can therefore be viewed above all as a means of making the prescribed shrinking process more palatable to the military. Added to this are the ambitious expectations linked to the “armament conversion” process that has begun, the success of which is by no means assured as yet: Whereas in 1989/90 approximately 40 percent of the goods produced by the armament plants are intended for civilian consumption, this share is supposed to increase to 60 percent by 1995.²⁶

This ambitious restructuring process alone makes clear the requirement for a fundamental and painful shifting of resources, so that any future push for qualitative improvement or modernization in the armed forces will at best be possible in a few select subareas. The surprising announcement by Defense Minister Yazov in early June 1990—transition to a compulsory military service tour of 18 months, and later to an army which is to consist primarily of career and long-term soldiers—demonstrates the pressure being applied to the armed forces command to adapt.²⁷ The reduction of 19.5 percent being sought in armament production by the end of 1990 likewise sends a very clear signal.

Under these auspices, the world power, the Soviet Union, can indeed be viewed in the summer of 1990 as only a “colossus with clay feet,” and under these circumstances the reorientation of those states of eastern Central Europe which still belong to the Warsaw Pact within the framework of a future European architecture takes on new security-political qualities. Even though officially only Hungary is meanwhile contemplating a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, for the medium term one can definitely speak of a new constellation in the offing. The attempt made in early June 1990 to give the Warsaw Pact a new sustaining political basis has significance only as a delaying tactic. Aside from the de facto dissolution of the Eastern alliance and the loss in significance of CEMA, the possibility under international law of an invalidation based on the emergence of conditions of dissolution is conceivable. The prime candidate for this is the legal device of “termination of the basis for the agreement” (*clausula rebus sic stantibus* [present-circumstances-only clause]).²⁸

Events in the Soviet Union, particularly the results of the 28th Party Congress (2 to 13 July), which brought about a significant change in the composition of the Central Committee and the Politburo, but also the recent strike by miners in the Donets Basin region, are indicative of the ordeal facing the Soviet imperium. The supply crisis and the secession movements of the individual nationalities, and not least the bloody excesses in Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan in June 1990, reached such proportions that the top echelon of government is being occupied more and more by catastrophic domestic developments; and so the decline of power in foreign relations continues almost of necessity. The statement made by Gorbachev on 13 July, to the effect that he was standing on the threshold of a multiparty system, is not yet a guarantee for the introduction of an economic system based on the Western model. The admission by the defense minister that grave problems exist in the army illustrates, among other things, the extent to which the army has been affected by the crisis in the Party, but here one still refuses to give in to demands calling for a complete stop to the wielding of influence by the Party in the armed forces.^{28a}

Even if one believes in the greatly reduced continued survivability of the Warsaw Pact, this would be conceivable only on the basis of a complete freedom to decide by

the individual members.²⁹ On the contrary, however, by granting this freedom to decide, the orientation of these states toward the EC or toward a status of neutrality is apt to come about even more rapidly. And so, whenever the decline in power of the Eastern alliance is lamented by many observers because of a feared destabilization of Eastern Europe, the only reply possible is that it was by no means the desire of NATO to become permanently reconciled to the military strength of the other side and the intentions associated therewith, which in the final analysis were aggressive in nature. It appears to be completely natural, therefore, to show greater satisfaction with the political and military power decline of the Soviet imperium—resulting in an opening to democratic ideas—than has generally been shown publicly in the West.³⁰

The convenient acclimatization to a condition that has now been in existence for 35 years should not let one forget that NATO has again and again emphasized the threatening conventional and nuclear superiority of the eastern alliance. Is the shrinking or the disappearance of this threat perhaps to be perceived as a new threat because of imponderables that may arise? Would it not be better to set about extracting acceptable elements for a future better "joint house" from the "security-political insolvent estate"?

V. Troop Reduction Negotiations and the Search for Improved Security in Europe

The current status of the "Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe" (CFE) is largely characterized by agreement on fundamental questions, but also by disagreement on difficult details. Among the basic areas of consensus is the plan to increase conventional stability and security in Europe, to do away with the "invasion capability" and the capability for strategic surprise. Even the long-range effort to achieve a defensive orientation of the military doctrines, also in the major formations, is undisputed. The draft agreements of the two pact groups have been ready since 14 December 1989.³¹

There is agreement in the establishment of a numerical upper limit of 20,000 per alliance with respect to battle tanks—16,000 of them in active units—throughout the entire territory covered by the decree (Europe between the Atlantic and the Ural river, including the Atlantic islands but excluding the southeastern part of Turkey). In addition, there was agreement for a time on armored combat vehicles, of which each alliance was to be permitted to have 28,000, with no more than 12,000 of them per side belonging to the subcategory of armored personnel carriers. However, differences of opinion revolved around the subsumption of the so-called "light tanks," which based on a proposal of the Soviets were to be ascribed to the "battle tanks," since in many respects they were credited with having the same combat effectiveness as the battle tanks, and since they suspected, in addition, that, in the event this subcategory was excluded, NATO might achieve an unpleasant numerical superiority in this area.

For that reason, the NATO states, already on 12 December 1989, submitted a supplementary proposal in which the upper limit for "armored combat vehicles" was increased to 30,000 per side, in return for which the subcategory of "light tanks" was to be subordinated to this main category. Agreement on the question of defining battle tanks was to a large degree informally reached during the spring of 1990. The compromise proposal presented by the Polish and French delegations establishes a minimum weight of 16.5 tons for battle tanks, an upper limit in Europe for armored combat vehicles of 30,000 per side, and a similar upper limit for armored personnel carriers and heavy support vehicles of 18,000 per side; the upper limit for subcategories of these support vehicles is to be 1,500 each. Final agreement in defining "battle tanks" and "armored combat vehicles" was eventually reached on 27 June, signifying a major step toward conclusion of a treaty.³²

A further significant consensus concerns the establishment of an upper limit of 1,900 per alliance for attack helicopters, even though no agreement has been reached as yet on the definition of this weapons system. The greatest difficulties by far, however, are being encountered in the determination of an upper limit for "combat aircraft." The Soviets did, to be sure, accede to a compromise which provided for all fighter-bombers, close air support aircraft, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and ECM [Electronic Countermeasures] aircraft (for electronic jamming and defense measures) of "tactical aviation forces," in the forward area and in the military districts, to be considered; fighter-interceptors of homeland air defense were at first excluded in their entirety, since they were declared to be purely defensive weapons.

Partial agreement was reached in early February 1990: Both sides accepted an upper limit for "combat aircraft" in Europe of 4,700 per side, with NATO desiring that a separate upper limit of 500 per side be in effect for fighter aircraft. Medium bombers and land-based naval aircraft were also included in this proposal, while the question of heavy bombers was to be taken up in a separate agreement. The Soviet side, on the other hand, demanded the concession of a separate upper limit of 1,500³³ for fighter aircraft of homeland air defense forces, as well as for circa 1,600 combat-capable trainer aircraft; official Soviet figures spoke of circa 1,800 fighter-interceptors of homeland air defense forces (PVO).

In the light of the security-political development up to mid-1990, the persistence of the Soviet Union in defending its past negotiating positions can be explained by the fact that it has only very little "negotiating material" left in order to offset the rapid changes taking place on the strategic map in Central Europe: The withdrawal completed on schedule on 31 May of nearly 26,000 men, 551 battle tanks, and 409 artillery pieces from the CSFR and the continuing withdrawal from Hungary will probably cause the Soviets to "cling tightly" to the last of the still remaining demands: And

so, for example, Marshal Kulikov again demanded in late May that naval forces as well as sea-based naval aircraft be included in the CFE, and it is no accident that since February 1990 the Soviet delegation in Vienna has demanded a "collective upper limit" of 700,000 to 750,000 men per side in Central Europe, including all NATO allies.

A reduction of Soviet and American troops in Central Europe in accordance with the upper limit of 195,000 each agreed to in February would permit a NATO potential in which just the combined forces of the Bundeswehr (under conditions currently in effect) and the U.S. 7th Army would add up to almost 690,000 men. On the other hand, there are decisions in existence which call for the Bundeswehr to cut back to circa 400,000 men

still this year through shortening its compulsory military service period to 12 months. Substitute civilian service is to last only 15 months in the future. Also the British, the Belgians, and the Dutch are showing tendencies toward withdrawing or cutting their stationed forces. In contrast, the Soviet Union has only the "Group of Forces, West" in the GDR and the "Group of Forces, North" in Poland left at this point to reinforce its position, since politically all the forward area states are seeking an approach to the West. It is for this reason that, since the late winter of 1989, the Soviets have repeatedly been demanding a drastic reduction of the Bundeswehr, not least with a view to an expected amalgamation of the armed forces of the two German states. These things alone are indicative of a power which from a position of weakness is trying to control the damage and to use its last trump cards to gain a reasonable compromise.

Upper Limit Proposals by the Two Sides for Europe as a Whole

Main Weapons Systems	NATO		Warsaw Pact	
Battle Tanks	20,000(A:16,000)	6 March 1989	20,000	18 May 1989
Artillery Pieces	16,500	6 March 1989	24,000	18 May 1989
Grenade/Multirocket Launchers above 100mm	A:14,500	21 September 1989		
Armored Combat Vehicles	28,000	6 March 1989	28,000	18 May 1989
(APC,AIFV,HACV)	30,000*)	14 June 1990	30,000*)	14 June 1990
AIFV + HAVC	18,000		18,000	
HAVC	1,500		1,500	
Combat Aircraft, Medium Bombers, (Land-Based) Naval Aircraft	4,700	8 February 1990	4,700	28 September 1989
Separate: Interceptors (PVO)	500	8 February 1990	1,500	
Attack Helicopters	1,900	13 July 1989	1,900	28 September 1989
Personnel Strength	No concrete proposal		1,350,000	18 May 1989
			300,000 men for allies outside the homeland	
			circa 700,000 men (Central Europe only)	

A: in active units

APC: Armored personnel carrier

AIFV: Armored infantry fighting vehicle

HAVC: Heavy armament combat vehicle

PVO: Homeland Air Defense

*) Compromise proposal of the Polish and French delegations, accepted on 27 June 1990

VI. Safeguarding of Stability: On the Pros and Cons of a "Security Partnership"

Even the summit conference in Washington, despite "atmospheric" successes, found no formula for embedding a reunified Germany into the much-implored European "security system" and for establishing a "safety net" for the USSR (nor had this been expected). Instead of this, one seems to be headed for a development which will leave in its wake a continuing decline of the Soviet imperium, a dramatic increase of its internal difficulties, and above all a dramatic sharpening of the nationality struggles in the USSR.³⁴ Should the West run the risk of

countering this development which can hardly be controlled from outside? Of what good would even sizable credits be for a state which would only use them to prolong the agony of the current situation? Where is the advantage of a "security partnership" in which one partner, namely Western Europe, is on the giving end, and the other on the receiving end, and this despite a primarily self-generated threat to the USSR from within?

The sudden swing taken by leading politicians in the NATO states since late March 1990 against modernization of the Lance missiles, as well as the planned negotiations on the dismantlement of nuclear short-range

systems, demonstrate that one wants to get rid of weapons which, aside from Central Europe, can threaten only eastern Central European states which can by no means still be considered "communist." The reflections on the renunciation of a nuclear "first strike" suggest that there will be a change in the NATO operational doctrine.

The NATO summit in London (5/6 July) confirmed the tendencies noted to date. As the most significant step, forward defense is to be abandoned and the doctrine is to be changed in such a way that nuclear weapons will then only play a "last resort" role. This only confirms that, politically, the modernization of short-range missiles is "dead" once and for all and that an extensive withdrawal of approximately 1,470 atomic artillery shells is viewed as a *fait accompli*. To be sure, no declaration was forthcoming relative to a renunciation of the "first strike" in which the role of nuclear deterrence in the future is limited to aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles. The offer was made to the Warsaw Pact states to sign a joint document proclaiming the mutual renunciation of the use of force, for which both pact groups have already expressed their willingness in the past. This declaration is now to be accessible for signature to all other CSCE states, which should be a decisive step toward overcoming the bloc mentality. In addition, the establishment of permanent diplomatic relations was offered to the Warsaw Pact.^{34a}

All these things are indicative of a far-reaching willingness for detente, even though in the question of membership of a unified Germany in the Atlantic alliance no concessions were made by NATO. As envisaged by the West, the size of the joint German armed forces is to be regulated within the framework of the first CFE treaty or during follow-on negotiations, largely so as to avoid giving the impression that Germany is being singled out in dealing with force levels. In this connection, the German-Soviet agreement of 16 July represents a significant building block in the vault of European security architecture: The limitation of the armed forces to 370,000 men, the agreement that NATO forces will not extend their presence into the present-day GDR as long as the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed there (within 3 to 4 years) has not been completed, and the renunciation by Germany of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. All this may have the appearance of a bilateral solution; in actuality, however, the contours of this complex of questions have been evident for some time already. The individual points still need to be tied into the CSCE negotiating process.

The Europe that is taking shape faces much more serious problems than the military threats of the past, so that NATO, too, has officially distanced itself from the use of the term "threat situation" in favor of "risk evaluation." A "security partnership" should therefore be focused instead on the burdens that will be associated with the drive by the states of eastern Central Europe toward

Western Europe, and in addition should endeavor to avoid all involvements in the whirlpool of events in the USSR.³⁵

Since, in the final analysis, supporting an untenable in-between state does not seem very promising, only the irrevocable radical rejection of Marxism-Leninism, with all the consequences arising therefrom, can promise success in the Soviet Union. In line with this, the Soviet leaders are faced with an old world that does not want to die and a new one that is not yet viable.³⁶

In creating the architecture of Europe, the trump cards are clearly on the side of the West. Since the "embedding" of a unified Germany in NATO has, since the agreement reached in Moscow and Archys on 16 July 1990, been accepted even by the Soviets,³⁷ the repeatedly voiced demands that Soviet security interests be considered appear to be tactically motivated: Regardless of whether treaties are drawn up between the two pact groups or there are bilateral treaties between individual states, the deciding factor will still be the political, intellectual, and economic attraction of Western Europe. One could therefore very well take the position that there will be no German question in the future but only a Soviet question.

Even though a reversion to the Cold War cannot be completely ruled out, the struggle for safeguarding "stability" is shifting more and more from the security-political and military level to another level: Will the states of Western and Central Europe muster up the strength to contain the dangers associated with the flare-up of nationalism and regional conflicts in Eastern and Southeastern Europe? Will the states of Western and Central Europe muster up the strength to cope not only with the material but also with the spiritual challenges which go hand in hand with what is expected of a new, better, and joint "House of Europe"? The "immigration and asylum-seeker question" time bomb is ticking louder than that of the military threat to Western Europe in the past.

Footnotes

1. In this connection, see the definition by Ingrid Schoelch, *Abschreckung, Sicherheit, Stabilitaet: Grundsatzprobleme der sicherheitspolitischen Situation in Europa* [Deterrence, Security, Stability: Fundamental Problems of the Security-Political Situation in Europe], Baden-Baden, 1989, p. 155, with a very detailed discussion of the various categories, levels and fields of "stability".

2. Cf. the submission titled "Strategische Stabilitaet" [Strategic Stability], in: Dieter S. Lutz (editor), *Lexikon Ruestung, Frieden, Sicherheit* [Encyclopedia for Armament, Peace, Security], Munich, 1987, pp. 294-297, specifically, p. 295.

3. Cf. I. Schoelch (see footnote 1).

4. Examples of the extensive literature on this question complex are as follows: Alfred Biele (editor), *Alternative*

Strategien [Alternative Strategies], Koblenz, 1986; Andreas von Buelow/Helmut Funk/Albrecht von Muel-ler, *Sicherheit fuer Europa* [Security for Europe], Koblenz, 1988; Wolfgang Schwarz, "Strukturelle Angriffsunfaehigkeit in Europa" [Structural Offensive Incapability in Europe], in: BEITRAEGE ZUR KONFLIKTFORSCHUNG, (1989) 2, pp. 5-36; Egon Bahr/Dieter S. Lutz (editors), *Gemeinsame Sicherheit—Konventionelle Stabilitaet* [Mutual Security—Conventional Stability], Vol III, Baden-Baden, 1988; Goetz Neuneck, *Strukturelle Angriffsunfaehigkeit und konventionelle Ruestungskontrolle* [Structural Offensive Incapability and Conventional Arms Control], Hamburg, 1988; Dieter S. Lutz, *Zur Theorie Struktureller Angriffsunfaehigkeit* [On the Theory of Structural Offensive Incapability], Hamburg, 1987; Karsten D. Voigt, "Konventionelle Stabilisierung und strukturelle Nichtangriffsunfaehigkeit" [Conventional Stabilization and Structural Non-Offensive Capability], in: AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, B 18/88, pp. 21-34.

5. K.D. Voigt (see footnote 4).

6. For details, see: Gerhard Wettig, "Die militaerischen Optionen in Europa" [Military Options in Europe], in: Erhard Forndran/Gert Krell (editor), *Kernwaffen im Ost-West-Vergleich* [An East-West Comparison of Nuclear Weapons], Baden-Baden, 1984, pp 117-155, specifically, p 141 ff; new: "Stichwort 'Alternative Verteidigungskonzepte'" [Key Word—Alternative Defense Concepts], in: Wichard Woyke (editor), *Handwoerterbuch Internationale Politik* [Concise Dictionary on International Politics], Opladen, 1990, p. 69.

7. Cf. Erhard Forndran, "Abschreckung und Stabilitaet—Ziele und Probleme" [Deterrence and Stability—Objectives and Problems], in: E. Forndran/G. Krell (see footnote 6), pp 15-57, specifically, p 43.

8. See, for example, the statement by Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Null-Loesung, Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 1970-1987* [Zero Option, Decision-Making Processes in Connection with Medium Range Weapons, 1970-1987], Frankfurt/Main-Berlin, 1988, p. 75.

9. For details, cf. D.S. Lutz (see footnote 4), p. 47 ff.

10. Cf. W. Schwarz (see footnote 4), p. 16.

11. Cf. Axel Buergener, "Operationsfuehrung 2000" [Operational Control in the Year 2000], in: SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, (1990) 4, pp. 231-238, specifically, p. 234.

12. Cf. Klaus Naumann, "Defensive Doktrinen und Streitkraeftestrukturen—ein Diskussionsbeitrag, vorgelegt im Rahmen des Wiener Doktrinenseminars (16. Januar bis 5. Februar 1990)" [Defensive Doctrines and Armed Forces Structures—a Contribution to the Discussion, Submitted during the Doctrinal Seminar in Vienna (16 January to 5 February 1990)].

13. Cf. "Mandat fuer Verhandlungen ueber konventionelle Streitkraefte in Europa" [Mandate for Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe], in: *Abschliessendes Dokument des Wiener Treffens 1986, Wien, 15. Januar 1989* [Final Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986, Vienna, 15 January 1989], p 39 ff.

14. Cf. Dieter Farwick, "Die Optionen des Warschauer Paktes gegenueber NATO-Europa" [The Options of the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis NATO-Europe], in: Hartmut Buehl (editor), *Strategiediskussion* [Discussion of Strategy], Herford-Bonn, 1987, pp. 91-104, specifically, p. 97 ff.

15. In this connection, reference is made to repeated statements by the Soviet defense minister and the chief of general staff on growing irritation among cadre personnel, on dissatisfaction with one's career, on the problem of conscientious objectors, on inequities in conscription, on malingering, and other questions; cf. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE of 11 February 1989, p. 1, and of 11 November 1989, p. 12; SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 13 November 1989, p. 8.

16. The figures are based on numerous individual items on the continuing withdrawal from the CSFR and Hungary, as well as on statements made by military experts during the "doctrinal seminar" in Vienna (16 January to 5 February 1990).

17. Officially, the strength of the armed forces of the CSFR was given in mid-May 1990 as 198,154 men, which is apparently the authorized strength. The ground forces are supposed to have just under 126,000 men and the air forces almost 22,000 men. Since a combined total of only 28,000 men are assigned to airspace surveillance, communications, intelligence, military schools, rear services, and civil defense, there is an unexplained balance of 22,000 men who evidently no longer perform military functions; cf. SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN of 12 May 1990, p. 4. Plans call for the armed forces of the CSFR to be reduced to 140,000 by 1993 and to be converted to a professional army at that time.

18. In connection with the planned final organization of the Hungarian army, cf. Istvan Gyarmati, "A Hungarian Security Policy for the 1990s," in: DEFENSE & DISARMAMENT ALTERNATIVES, April 1990, p. 3 ff. In addition to these measures, a reduction to only two corps with four combat brigades each west and east of the Danube, plus one fighter aircraft regiment and one helicopter regiment as a central strike force reserve in central Hungary, is being proposed, while the non-assimilated conscripts are combined into territorial battalions.

19. Cf. "In Polen weitere Truppenverminderungen" [Further Troop Cuts in Poland], in: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of 6 January 1990, p. 3.

20. Cf. Cf. "Sowjetunion/Warschauer Pakt: Truppenreduzierung und Ruestungskontrolle" [Soviet

Union/Warsaw Pact: Troop Reduction and Arms Control], in: OESTERREICHISCHE MILITÄRZEITSCHRIFT (OeMZ), (1989) 4, pp. 332-334, specifically, p. 333.

21. Cf. Lutz Unterseher, "...der Osten macht ernst" [...the East Means Business], in: SICHERHEIT UND FRIEDEN [Security and Peace], (1989) 4, pp. 248-251, specifically, p. 251.

22. See, for example, Hans-Henning Schroeder, "Wirtschaft und Ruestung in der Sowjetunion" [Economics and Armament in the Soviet Union], in: SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, (1988) 7, pp. 383-387; by the same author, "Kuerzung der sowjetischen Militärausgaben und Ansaetze zur Konversion" [Reduction of Soviet Military Expenditures and First Attempts at Conversion], (BIOST 57/1989), Cologne, 1989; Friedrich Korkisch, "Wirtschaftslage und Streitkraeftereduzierung" [Economic Situation and Armed Forces Reduction], in: OeMZ (1989) 3, pp. 249-252.

23. See, in this connection, the controversy between James E. Steiner and Franklyn D. Holzman, in: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1990, pp. 185-199, specifically, p. 190.

24. Cf. Hans-Hermann Hoehmann, "Durch Krisen aus der Krise? Sowjetische Wirtschaft im fueften Jahr der 'Perestroika'" [Overcoming the Crisis By Means of Crises? Soviet Economy in the Fifth Year of Perestroika], in: TRUPPENPRAXIS, (1989) 5, pp. 494-497, specifically, p. 495.

25. Cf. KRAZNAYA SVEZDA of 26 January 1990, p. 2.

26. Cf. "Probleme und Erfolge der Konversion" [Problems and Successes of Conversion], in: SOWJETUNION HEUTE [The Soviet Union Today], (1990) 2, p. 51.

27. Cf. "Jasow plant grosse Militaerreform" [Yazov Plans Large-Scale Military Reform], in: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE of 5 June 1990, p. 7.

28. Cf. Karl-Heinz Gimmler, "Rebus sic stantibus. Das real existierende Warschauer-Pakt-System und voelkerrechtliche Moeglichkeiten seiner Beendigung" [With Matters So Standing: The Warsaw Pact System As It Actually Exists and the Possibilities for Its Termination Under International Law], in: TRUPPENPRAXIS, (1990) 3, pp. 240-246, specifically, p. 242.

28a. "Jasow ueber Veraenderungen in der Sowjetarmee" [Yazov on Changes in the Soviet Army], in: NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG of 6 July 1990, p. 1. The demand that the party stop trying to exert an influence was above all voiced by the striking miners in the Donets Basin in early July.

29. Cf. Manfred Backerra, "Der Warschauer Pakt. Noch lebensfaehig?" [The Warsaw Pact. Still Viable?], in: INFORMATION FUER DIE TRUPPE [Information for the Troops], (1990) 5, pp. 40-53, specifically, p. 53. Concerning the various options of the Eastern alliance,

see also Joachim Krause, "Welche Perspektiven hat der Warschauer Pakt?" (unveroeffentliches Manuskript) [What Are the Prospects for the Warsaw Pact? (unpublished manuscript)], Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [Foundation for Science and Politics], Ebenhausen, 1990.

30. Cf. Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Auf dem Weg zum postkommunistischen Europa" [On the Road to a Post-Communist Europe], in: EUROPA-ARCHIV [European Archive], (1989) 11, pp. 319-330, specifically, p. 326.

31. With reference to the draft treaties, cf. BASIC Report from Vienna, ed. British American Security Information Council, London- Washington D.C., 15 January 1990.

32. Cf. "Weitere Stagnation bei den CFE-Verhandlungen" [Continuing Stagnation at the CFE Negotiations], in: NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG of 17/18 June 1990, p. 3; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 28 June 1990, p. 2; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE of 28 June 1990, p. 6.

33. For details on this, cf. "Die Verhandlungen ueber konventionelle Streitkraefte in Europa: Die 4. und 5. Session und das 'Seminar ueber Sicherheitskonzepte und Militaerdoktrinen'" [The Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe: The 4th and 5th Sessions and the 'Seminar on Security Concepts and Military Doctrines'], in OeMZ, (1990) 2, p. 151 ff.

34. Cf. Christoph Bertram, "Schienen frei nach Deutschland" [A Clear Track Ahead to Germany], in: DIE ZEIT of 1 June 1990, p. 3.

34a. With regard to the NATO summit, see DIE WELT of 7 July 1990, p. 1; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE of 7 July 1990 ("Aus London Friedenssignale der NATO an die Laender des Warschauer Paktes") [NATO Peace Signals from London to the States of the Warsaw Pact]; DIE WELT of 6 July 1990, p. 6 ("50,000 Soldaten sind das Maximum auf dem heutigen Gebiet der DDR") [50,000 Troops Are the Maximum on the Territory of the Present-Day GDR]. Initial plans for the upper limit of the joint German armed forces range between 300,000 and 400,000 men. It is interesting to note that public opinion polls show that the population of the FRG and of the GDR views a future neutral status of Germany much more positively than is reflected in the official policy; 80 percent of the GDR citizens and 53 percent of the FRG citizens would prefer neutrality to continued membership in the Western alliance; 71 percent of the GDR citizens and 34 percent of the FRG citizens were opposed to NATO membership by Germany, see DIE PRESSE of 5 July 1990, p. 4.

35. In this connection, see Anonymous (Z), "Ueber das Stalinmausoleum" [On the Stalin Mausoleum], in: EUROPÄISCHE RUNDSCHAU [European Survey], (1990) 2, pp. 31-72, particularly p. 70 ff; "Soviet Empire Will Fall, Pentagon Experts Predict," in: WASHINGTON TIMES of 21 March 1990, p. 6. In addition,

there are other, similarly pessimistic estimates of short- and medium-range developments in the Soviet Union available; see, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Das gescheiterte Experiment: Der Untergang des kommunistischen Systems* [The Experiment That Failed: The Decline of the Communist System], Vienna, 1989; Ernest Mandel, *Das Gorbatschow-Experiment, Ziele und Widersprüche* [The Gorbachev Experiment, Objectives and Contradictions], Frankfurt/Main, 1989, p. 257 ff.

36. Cf. Anonymous (Z), op. cit., p. 65.

37. On the early history leading up to the yielding by the Soviets in the Germany question, see, for example, the interview with the Soviet Germany-expert Dachichev, "Ein vereinigtes Deutschland im Rahmen der NATO binden" [A Unified Germany Must Be Bound to the NATO Framework], in *DIE WELT* of 20 March 1990, p. 9; likewise "Daschitschew: Kompromiss moeglich" [Dachichev: A Compromise Possible], in: *DIE WELT* of 20 June 1990, p. 6.

[Box, p 2] Heinz Magenheimer, Ph.D., born in 1943; since 1972 a member of the Institute for Strategic Basic Research at the National Defense Academy in Vienna; since 1977 a member of the editorial staff of the *OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT*; since 1982 a lecturer at the University of Salzburg.

Publications include: *Abwehrschlacht an der Weichsel 1945* [Defensive Battle along the Vistula in 1945], Freiburg/Breisgau, 1986; *Die Verteidigung Westeuropas, Doktrin, Kraeftestand, Einsatzplanung* [The Defense of Western Europe, Doctrine, Force Levels, Operational Planning], Koblenz, 1986; numerous articles appearing in periodicals and studies in domestic and foreign publications on topics of security policy, the armed forces, and the history of war.

Bonn To Continue in Nuclear Strategy

AU1210141790 Munich *SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG* in German 11 Oct 90 p 2

["cas" report: "Bonn: Continued Participation in Nuclear Strategy"]

[Text] Bonn—The united Germany, too, will retain the options of "nuclear participation" and the so-called co-disposal of nuclear weapons of other states. Furthermore, the fact remains that Germany may participate in the production of nuclear systems outside its own territory. This was confirmed in writing to Bundestag Deputy Tay Eich (Greens) by Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer, state minister in the Foreign Ministry.

On 22 August in Geneva, at the Fourth Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher affirmed the FRG's previous declaration of renunciation and ruled out "disposal" of nuclear weapons on the part of Germany. The text of Genscher's statement was included in the Moscow final document of the two-plus-four talks on Germany; this was not done, however, with the proposal to call the

renunciation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, "permanent" in addition. Eich's written inquiry whether Germany now also renounces nuclear participation and the co-disposal of nuclear weapons of other states, was answered by State Minister Adam-Schwaetzer by saying that Genscher affirmed the previous obligations of the two German states "without changing their contents in any way." Thus, the previous reservations and restrictions remain in existence: Within the framework of the West European Union (WEU), in the 1950's the FRG Government declared its renunciation of the development and production of nuclear weapons on its own territory but left open the participation in their production in cooperation with other states on the territory of these states. At the ratification of the 1975 Nonproliferation Treaty, Bonn reserved for itself the possibility of co-disposal of nuclear weapons within the framework of a future European political union.

The FRG has carrier systems for NATO's nuclear weapons, Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer writes to Tay Eich, and this is precisely what the nuclear participation consists of at the moment. Concerning the tightening of the guidelines for nuclear exports, which were also announced by Minister Genscher in Geneva, she notes that this does "not affect" cooperation with France—which has nuclear weapons.

In addition, it has meanwhile become known in Bonn that the nuclear warheads of the Pershing-2 carrier missiles, which are to be scrapped in line with the INF Treaty, are being mounted on bombs which are to be used to equip combat planes of the United States and NATO in Western Europe in the course of "modernization." This has been proved by a U.S. study. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group plans to deal with the stationing of new "air-based" nuclear weapons in the west of Germany, among other places, at the meeting on 7 December.

TURKEY

Official Remarks on Conventional Weapons Accord

TA1710145390 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1100 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Turkey has stated that an agreement on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe should not contain articles that might cast a shadow over national security and mutual trust.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Murat Sungar, on being reminded about various reports on the issue at his weekly news conference, said that Turkey, like every country participating in the Vienna talks, has various priorities and that national security is one of them. Pointing out that the last phase of a disarmament agreement of historic importance and content has been reached, Sungar added that the major goal is to produce a document that will make an effective contribution to

peace and stability. He said that one of the issues taken up at the talks was the control mechanism governing heavy armament belonging to paramilitary forces. He noted that this issue concerns not only Turkey, but all the participating countries. Noting that the possibilities for resolving this issue were being looked into by the allied countries, Sungar added: In light of this assessment, Turkey is determined to continue making the necessary contributions to solve all the existing problems, including those involving the paramilitary forces, and to enable an agreement to be reached by the target date.

Giray: No Crisis in Conventional Arms Talks

TA1810154590 Istanbul *MILLIYET* in Turkish
17 Oct 90 p 13

[Report by Nilufer Yalcin]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry was shocked when our Brussels correspondent Mehmet Ali Birand revealed in his article that Turkey had adopted a decisive stand against the U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal, during the final stage of the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE], to equip "paramilitary forces" with heavy armored weapons and exclude them from any supervision. Until now, Foreign Ministry circles have claimed that the CFE talks are developing in Turkey's favor and that once the arms reductions are finalized, the programs on the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces will be developed at a faster rate. The Foreign Ministry discussed at length how to clarify the disagreement revealed by Birand and formulated a statement.

Meanwhile, asked to comment on the subject, National Defense Minister Safa Giray said: "I heard this from you now. Our ministry has not yet been informed about this matter. In any case, the Foreign Ministry is conducting the negotiations."

Giray added: "The CFE talks are continuing. We have another month. If such an issue had led to a crisis, the negotiations would have been suspended. I do not know for certain what the Soviets have offered. Their proposal, however, could not have been accepted by all the negotiating parties. The issue could not, therefore, have been submitted for Turkey's approval nor could a decision have been made to veto this decision. If, however, a situation arises at the end of the talks contrary to Turkey's national interests, we will certainly include it in the government's agenda and adopt a position accordingly."

Recalling that other controversial issues also arose in the past during the CFE talks, Giray cited as an example the arguments regarding whether or not to include the respective countries' naval planes within the scope of the arms reduction agreement. Giray also expressed the hope that decisions that will dispel Turkey's concerns will be adopted during the CFE talks.

How Did the Crisis Erupt

According to information received from Defense and Foreign Ministry circles, the problem was triggered when the Soviet Government began increasing the number of "paramilitary forces," which were to be excluded from "arms reduction and supervision" as decided on in principle during the CFE talks, and equipping them with armament such as heavy tanks, armored vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.

In the USSR, gendarme, KGB, and similar military forces are considered "paramilitary," and these forces are used whenever necessary as police, in lieu of troops, to quell internal uprisings, rebellions, or armed clashes. Moscow argued that these forces should be excluded from arms reduction or supervision because they are outside the arms reduction area extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." During the CFE talks, it was agreed that these paramilitary forces be excluded from the weapons reduction agreement. The fact that the Soviet Union began supplying these forces with heavy armament and increasing their numbers significantly in recent months began to unsettle Turkey, the only NATO country bordering the USSR.

Meanwhile, it was reported that during the meeting between the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers in New York, Shevardnadze insisted on keeping these forces outside the jurisdiction of the supervision mechanism, and Baker agreed to this. Officials said: "Naturally this subject does not directly threaten the national security of the United States, but how will Turkey balance this heavily equipped force in the Caucasus? More correctly, how will Turkey agree to such an imbalance? It is on this point that Turkey adopted a decisive attitude, which may lead to a refusal to sign the CFE agreement. The Turkish side is insisting that the heavy armament to be supplied by the Soviet Union to the paramilitary forces also be included in the reduction and supervision program."

Diplomatic observers, in turn, do not believe that any measure that would disrupt the elements of security and balance attained through the reduction of conventional weapons by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could be accepted by Ankara without a guarantee or a reversal of this decision.

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